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Baumol’s contributions in welfare economics mark the beginning of his eclectic career. His 
involvement in the new welfare economics debate was driven by both the cultural environment at 
the London School of Economics, where he obtained his Ph.D, and his dissatisfaction for the 
status of the discipline. Baumol’s book Welfare Economics and The Theory of the State can be considered 
an example of crossing tradition works in public economics and an attempt to draw attention to the 
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The Beginning of an Eclectic Career 
William J. Baumol is one of those economists that everyone remembers, but no one really 
knows. Eclectic scholar, he was professor at Princeton and New York University, president of the 
American Economic Association in 1981, candidate to Nobel Prize and many generations of 
students have grown with his textbooks. Despite his notoriety, there are very few papers about him. 
The only aspect that has been studied is his contributions to the theory of entrepreneur in the 
economy, but beside this, Baumol still remains a famous yet mysterious economist. One reason 
could be that his production is enormous, thus it extremely difficult to have an overall idea of the 
importance of his contributions. Baumol obtained a Ph.D. at the London School of Economics. 
thesis on welfare economics and a good starting point to study his contribution could be to assesses 
the role in the New Welfare Economics debate during the years from 1946 to 1965. There are two 
lines of research. First his dissatisfaction with the state of the field which brought him to write 
about externalities. Second, his welfare economic studies as part of his economic production, the 
content of his theories and the relationship with the existing literature. The time interval 
corresponds to his arrival at the London School of Economics after the Second World War and the 
publication of the second edition of his Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State1.  
 
 
1- A Glimpse of Baumol’s Life 
William J. Baumol was born in New York City in 1922, son of Jewish Polish-Lithuanian 
immigrants. His parents were both self-educated intellectuals and convinced Marxists, so they 
introduced him to economics and he became very passionate about the subject: 
 
                                                        
1 The analysis of published material is integrated with documents from the Baumol’s archives at Duke 




But I did a lot of reading. And a lot of reading particularly of Karl Marx, because both my 
wife and I grew up in very left wing households. Even though we were both, from very 
early days, suspicious of things like what Stalin was doing, the fact was that we still believed 
in things like nondiscrimination, elimination of poverty, etc., etc., as prime social issues. I 
can claim that we've never deviated from those views. [Krueger 2001: 212] 
 
Baumol enrolled in the College of the City of New York (CCNY) in 1938 and graduated in 1942. 
Baumol recollected that at that time, the department of economics was mediocre, so some students 
of economics decided to study economics by themselves and to discuss together what they learned 
in self-taught classes. Baumol was assigned to microeconomics and that is how he became so 
passionate and familiar with this discipline. This is also how he learned how to debate fiercely, an 
attitude that later on will shape his fortune at the London School of Economics. Baumol graduated 
with two majors, one in economics and the other in visual arts, painting and lithography. His two 
sides, economist and artist, continued through all his life. His graduation coincided with the 
moment for the US to enter in the Second World War. Before the war he married Hilda Missel, 
who later coauthored with him many papers on the economic history of the arts.  
During the war, after a brief time in the Department of Agriculture, he was sent to Europe as a 
soldier. He took graduate correspondence courses in mathematics from the University of Wisconsin 
while he was stationed in Rouen. He also learned wood sculpture from some German prisoners just 
after the end of the war, a subject that some years later he would teach at Princeton. When the war 
ended, Baumol worked for a short period of time again at the Department of Agriculture. He was 
assigned to the division responsible for the allocation of grain among allied countries. “But this time 
the task was very different: the allocation of the US grain resources among the countries of a 
hungry world. Two prime lessons emerged from this experience – the high cost of the negotiation 
process and the complexities of the calculation of fairness” (Baumol 1984a: 313).  
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After this brief stint at the Department of Agriculture, Baumol enrolled in the London School of 
Economics in 1946. His first application was rejected, probably because the CCNY was not known 
in the United Kingdom. He then wrote back asking if he could make another application the next 
year. At that time, Lionel Robbins was senior professor of economics at the LSE. Robbins was 
impressed by Baumol’s will to come to the LSE and decided to admit him as a master student. 
After some time, Baumol proved to be a clever and prepared scholar and he was promoted to 
Ph.D. candidate and he became also member of the faculty. Baumol and Robbins became close 
friends and their friendship lasted even when Baumol went back to the US, as proven by many 
letters between them.  
Robbins ran a graduate seminar together with Jacob Viner in 1946 and Baumol was “the most 
argumentative participant” (Howson 2011: 654), a role that was Nicolas Kaldor’s in the 1930s, a trait 
that impressed the LSE board of professors2. Thanks to Robbins’ prestige and to the great bustle of 
scholars, he made to know many other important economists like Kaldor, Friedrich Hayek and 
Arthur Lewis (Baumol 1984a: 312). According to him, a Ph.D. was not necessary to become a 
professor in the United Kingdom and “At that time, Ph.D.’s were things that were given only to crazy 
Americans” (Krueger 2001: 214). This particular situation gave him the opportunity to work while 
writing his dissertation, “because few English faculty members had anything like a Ph.D. and did not 
take the degree seriously” (Baumol 1984a: 314).  
Baumol taught two courses at the LSE, one on economic dynamics and the other one on 
American economy. “Economic dynamics is the study of economic phenomena in relation to 
preceding and succeeding events” (Baumol 1951: 4). The materials for the first course will became his 
first book, Economic Dynamics (1951). He discussed his Ph.D. dissertation in 1949 and his discussion 
lasted five hours. Some of the faculty still considered a Ph.D. an “American aberration”, so the 
discussion was much more like an exchange of ideas. Baumol recalls in particular that the idea for a 
dissertation was a group product:  
                                                        
2 Nicolas Kaldor (1908 – 1986), was a famous Cambridge Post-Keynesian economist.  
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In the hotbed of discussion that constituted the LSE the dissertation’s ideas were very 
much a group product. We had made an effort to revive the famous Cambridge, LSE, 
Oxford seminar of the 1930s, and these subjects were discussed at the joint sessions, 
bringing in ideas from outside LSE: Jan de v. Graaff played a leading part, he and I 
spending large amounts of time discussing one another’s work on welfare economics. 
[Baumol 1984a: 315] 
 
Baumol and his wife were determined to go back to the United States. Robbins offered him a 
position at the LSE, but when Baumol refused, he recommended him to Friedrich Lutz, a professor 
at Princeton who was visiting the LSE. He received and accepted an offer of an assistant 
professorship after some weeks. He taught there until his retirement in 1992, but, starting from 1970, 
he divided his academic activity between Princeton and the New York University, where he was an 
associate of the C.V. Starr center. He made many friends among graduate students at Princeton: 
Martin Shubik, Harvey Liebenstein and, after a while, Richard Quandt, Otto Eckstein and Gary 
Becker. Many of them would became coauthors of Baumol some years later. Beside his career as 
professor, Baumol carried out some important jobs as a consultant for firms and for the U.S. 
government starting from 1953. Particularly famous were his consultant activities for regulatory cases. 
“It was a very valuable experience, teaching me how theoretical instruments can be applied flexibly to 
the complex and messy problems of reality” (Baumol 1984a: 320). The experiences and knowledge 







2- Welfare Economics as a Tool, Not an End 
2.1 Welfare Economics and Externalities 
Baumol started to write about welfare economics in a period of great turbulence. The 
welfare economics field was subject to two main transformations during its troubled life. The first 
one was the rise of the New Welfare Economics after the publication of Robbins’s book An Essay 
on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science in 1932. Some economists accepted Robbin’s critique, 
while others tried to avoid it and build new welfare economics instruments. The New Welfare 
Economics was not an organized and systematic movement, but it is possible to retrace two 
different approaches to welfare economics. The British approach was built on the roots of the 
“Old” welfare economics of Pigou and Marshall, and tried to bypass the problem of comparison of 
utilities by proposing a “Pareto efficiency criterion”. It consists in a system of hypothetical 
compensations to be evaluated after the introduction of an innovation or a policy measure. The 
main exponents were Nicholas Kaldor (1939), John Hicks (1941) and Tibor Scitovsky (1941). The 
American school, on the other hand, was based on the social welfare definition formulated by 
Bergson in 1938 and crystallized in the social welfare function by Samuelson in 1947. Each 
individual derives this function from the social state and its shape captures some value judgements. 
A second important wave of debate in welfare economics started after the publication of 
Kenneth Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951. Despite the fact that many economists 
considered this result a disaster for welfare economics, for Baumol Arrow’s results won’t have a 
small impact on welfare economics and the book “need not be viewed as cause for alarm (Baumol 
1952: 110), because it is licit to relax some of Arrow’s assumptions in welfare analysis without 
incurring in logical errors. This was an unpopular opinion, since the majority of economists saw in 
Arrow’s book the end of welfare economics.  
Arrow’s book is considered one of the causes of the diversification of normative economics 
into social choice theory and public economics. (Edwards, Pellè 2011; 336). We can retrace two 
different routes that welfare economics took after the 1950s. The first one is the end of the 
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compensation principle; and the second is the discovery of the drawbacks of the first fundamental 
theorem and the glimpse of the second fundamental theorem. This caused a gradual shift from pure 
theoretical debate to the applied side of economics and also of welfare economics. 
The literature on welfare economics was accompanied by the studies on the problem of 
externalities. A broad notion of externalities was already present in Smith, although he never called 
them externalities. However, after the theories of Marshall and Pigou, the systematic study of 
externalities was put aside from the economic discourse. Externalities did not disappear completely, 
but if they were mentioned at all it was only to show that they were an impediment to the 
attainment of the optimum allocation of resources. Baumol wrote his thesis in this period of 
considerable debate within welfare economics, but relatively little debate over externalities theory. 
There were several economists who wrote their Ph.D. thesis on welfare economics, but very few of 
them mentioned externalities. In 1943 Hla Myint obtained his Ph.D. at the LSE with a thesis 
“Postulates of Welfare Economics” which became Theories of Welfare Economics in 19483. Myint 
pointed out what was a common belief at the time, the fact that embed externalities in the analysis 
would mine the elegance of the theories, without going much further in the analysis. M. W. Reder‘s 
Studies in the Theory of Welfare Economics (1947), a book derived from his Columbia University Ph. D. 
dissertation,  summarized the available theories, making only small mention of external effects. 
However, he ruled out the analysis of external effects. In another Ph.D. dissertation (Oxford) 
published as A Critique of Welfare Economics (1950), Ian M. D. Little mentioned externalities just to 
say that they are an impediment to reaching welfare optimality, without providing further analysis. 
Both Reder and Little believed that externalities would not restrict the validity of their analysis and 
that the inclusion will destroy the precision of the findings (Medema 2017; 25).  
This lacuna in externality studies was not ignored. For example, James Meade at LSE noted 
that it was very strange that Abba Lerner, in his important book The Economics of Control: Principles of 
                                                        
3 Hla Myint (1920 –2017) was a Burmese economist famous for his pioneering contributions in development 
economics and for his contributions to welfare economics. 
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Welfare Economics (1944), omitted the discussion in externalities (Medema 2017). Baumol, again at 
the LSE, agreed with Meade, recognizing that external economies were a neglected subject. He was 
surprised by the absence of externalities in the book by Lerner and by the fact that externalities are 
treated by economist like “freakish exceptions” (Baumol 1952: 63). Externalities became again the 
object of theorizing in 1950s, when economists started to study them again as an independent 
object and not as part of other frameworks. Moving to the end of 1950s, under the pressure of 
evident social problems, externalities were applied to some policy relevant issues. This bought 
authors to slowly focus on several other aspects related to externalities, such as their remedies.  
 
2.2 The Paradox of the State 
Baumol, being at the LSE, was immersed in the British approach to welfare economics, as 
his first papers on the community indifference curves show. However, he showed signs of 
dissatisfaction with the current status of research both on welfare economics and externalities. For 
example, in the review of Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis he criticized the fact that 
Samuelson did not consider the external economies of consumption in constructing his social 
welfare function. This leads him not to consider some problems that are defined by Baumol the 
most interesting of welfare economics. His personal response to this lack of interest for externalities 
is contained in his Ph.D. thesis, published as a book with the title Welfare Economics and The Theory of 
the State. 
Together with Economic Dynamics (1951), Welfare Economics and The Theory of the State is Baumol’s 
second main book and it was published in 1952. Baumol never talked much about his thesis, but it is 
reasonable to argue that the dissatisfaction with the current state of studies and the cultural 
environment at the LSE, awakened Baumol’s interest for the subject. Baumol reacted to the debates 
on welfare economics and its usefulness with a simple intuition: by connecting welfare economics 
with externalities, it is possible to apply welfare economics to concrete cases and formulate policy 
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recommendations. In an article of 1984 there is a rare description of his intention in writing that 
thesis:  
 
The thesis, later published as Welfare Economics and The Theory of The State, took off from 
Marshall-Pigou theory of externalities, then a neglected subject widely considered to be of 
minor importance. It sought to generalize the idea to as diverse a set of subjects as the 
behaviour of competitors, the difficulty of cartel formation and the theory of inflation (all 
of which we were already characterizing as a prisoners’ dilemma problems in the new 
fangled theory of games). More than that, I hoped to derive  from the logic of externalities 
the rationale for all government intervention in the workings of the economy – notions 
later echoed in works of Buchanan and Tulloch and the writings of Mancur Olson. 
[Baumol 1984a: 315] 
 
Although the general framework can be called Pigouvian, there are two differences with respect to 
Pigou. The first one is that Baumol is taking into consideration the non-cooperative behavior of 
individuals. He clearly stated in the preface to the second edition: “The book undertook to explore 
systematically the relevance of the externalities argument for the relationship between the interest of 
the individuals and the interests of the group” (Baumol 1965; IX). The second and most relevant 
one, is that he wanted to use the externalities argument in a non-cooperative setting as the rationale 
to determine if the government intervention in the economy is good from a welfare point of view.  
Richard Sturn (2016) put Baumol’s book in the tradition of British public economics. The British 
tradition of public economics built up from the notion of market failures: in case of market failures, 
the British tradition developed the basis to justify the government intervention in the economy. 
This brings to the analysis of price systems were interdependences are not corrected by prices. “. 
The paradigmatic conceptualization of such coordination gaps was originally developed within the 
Marshallian partial equilibrium framework: an interdependence not properly mediated by a “correct 
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price” is called an externality, conceptually pre- supposing the existence of a price system properly 
mediating all other interdependences.” (Sturn 2016: 490). However, as we have seen, externalities 
remained out of the research agenda for a long time, or a “freakish exception” for mainstream 
economics. Baumol’s book was then not only an attempt to shed light on the problem of 
externalities, but also on the policy recommendations in absence of a “correct price” solution. 
Public economics is an interdisciplinary subject, which studies the government policies using the 
tools of welfare economics, but also philosophical reasoning on the nature of the State. In the 
tradition of public economics there are many authors who wrote on specific problems, like taxation, 
practices of public economics, relationship between public institutions and property rights. Baumol 
belongs to a category of economists who contributed in different ways, integrating different fields: 
conceptual framework, normative reasoning, technical innovations. Welfare economics is in fact an 
important strand of public economics and it offers many tools to the discipline.  
The Anglo- Saxon tradition, with its attention of externalities, inaugurated a normative approach to 
public economics and it was important for the development of the discipline. It considered 
government intervention on a case-by-case basis, with the application of theoretical tools and 
empirical methods, allowing also the promotion of the professional role for the university-trained 
expert economists, especially in the Pigouvian tradition (Sturn 2016: 491). 
Baumol tried to use the welfare economics framework and the theory of externalities to 
construct a valid rationale for state intervention in the economy: “This theory should explain why, 
with rational citizens (and particularly in a democracy), governmental interference in the operation of 
the economy is tolerated at all.” (Baumol 1952: 12). The central theme of Baumol’s book is to explain 
why some people living in a democracy choose voluntary to be subjected to the state coercion. The 
paradox is that this voluntary acceptance of coercion may be perfectly reasonable. There are two 
types of cases in which people accept the coercion of the state:  ones in which the individuals know 
that without the coercion, they will make decisions that will harm themselves and ones in which the 
acceptance by the individuals of rules that limit their conduct is necessary to justify others accepting 
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desirable limits on their conduct, as well. “The inquiry examines the rationale of the coercive 
functions of government. The problem can be put in the form of a paradox. If the public approves of 
an extension of government interference, people must in some sense feel themselves better off as a 
result of being forced to change their behavior. People must want to be prevented from doing what 
they do!” (Baumol 1954: 275). The key to his economic theory of the state is the existence of 
economies and diseconomies of production and consumption and Baumol tried to extend the 
externalities analysis to fields that are not commonly associated with externalities, such as inflation, 
recession, unemployment and defense. The problem here is when the self-interested act of the 
individuals affects the lives and choices of others at a point where there is a reduction in the product 
of the economy, with the possibility that every individual will be worse-off. In presence of 
externalities, the perfectly competitive equilibrium is not a sufficient condition for an optimum 
production and even different market structures such as monopoly became more difficult to evaluate 
with respect to the traditional analysis. In the presence of externalities, the singular desire for profit 
does not assure the realization of the necessary conditions for the social optimum. His actual starting 
point is the long-lasting battle between the advocates of laissez-fair and the one of government 
regulation of economic activity. It is worth to quote the whole passage:  
 
There is a considerable difference between anarchism and the classical laissez-faire. 
Government was a highly desirable institution to the advocates of the latter provided, of 
course, that its activities were severely circumscribed. […] 
It is clear that any yardstick which pretends to indicate the proper sphere of government 
must itself be arbitrarily based on some peculiar set of ethical preconceptions. But there is 
an alternative approach to the problem which is adopted in this essay and can be 
considered equivalent either to cutting the knot or evading the issue, depending on one’s 
point of view. It is an attempt to determine which, if any, are the circumstances in which 
the people composing an economy will find that a particular extension of the authority of 
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their government is requisite for the most efficient pursuit of their own economic interest. 
[Baumol 1952: 11] 
 
The first lines of Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State contain two fundamental elements: the 
first is the avoidance of a political theory of the state in favour of an economic one. Baumol 
considered two cases only apparently similar: laissez-faire and anarchism. The difference between 
them lies in this distinction: the former allows the presence of government, while the latter refuses 
it in toto. Baumol’s goal is not to justify the whole presence of the state, but just its intervention in 
the economy. He wanted to eliminate the arbitrary element in the selection of a government’s task 
by using the available instruments of the welfare economics.  
The second one is that the ultimate goal of Baumol’s analysis is to show that the presence of 
government can be an efficient way to be left free of pursue individual economic interest. From the 
point of view of an opposer to government intervention, the situation in which the latter is the 
condition that assures the most efficient pursuit of individual economic interest seems at least 
paradoxical. However, it is precisely here that Baumol’s argument is subtler: his theory of the state is 
not an ideological apology of the stare intervention for the greater good, but is a reasoned analysis on 
how the state can help people to achieve their individual economic interest. Baumol is challenging the 
view that the maximum welfare is always achieved in a competitive capitalism. For him, it is a claim 
that should be proven, rather than a self-evident truth. He proceeded on two lines: first, he 
challenged the view that the pursuit of the self-interest by individuals led to an increase of the welfare 
for the society and second, that the perfect competition should not be treated as the base case for 
economic analysis.  
Thus justification of any assertion that the common welfare is in some sense necessarily 
served in the working of a competitive capitalism would appear not to be trivial. To us, of 
course, this question is of the essence in formulating a theory of the state, for by the 
criterion here adopted, to the extent that the social welfare is served automatically by the 
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economy as well as is possible, governmental activity becomes redundant. [Baumol 1952; 
18] 
 
Baumol’s reasoning is simple. He started from the definition of the normative setting that the 
society should aim to attain. Then he shows a series of pitfalls that can affect this ideal situation and 
how those pitfalls depend both on externalities and inability of people to coordinate themselves. He 
starts from the definition of the ideal output as the situation where “no alternative output which could 
be obtained by means of reallocation among the various industries of the economy’s resources would 
leave the community better off than before” (Baumol 1952: 26), which is in fact Pareto optimality. The 
ideal output is a notion borrowed from Richard Kahn and it is useful because it sets the main problem 
of welfare economics, i.e. the optimal allocation of resources among individuals. Baumol then show 
how this ideal situation is literally ideal, in the sense that it is very difficult to reach in the real world. 
Through a series of pitfalls in the standard theory, Baumol shows in his work how externalities are in 
fact a common phenomenon that can affect different areas conventionally not associated with 
externalities. Among those cases we can find some topics that will return in Baumol’s production.  
The most interesting example is the discussion on the monopoly output from the point of view 
of the entrepreneur. For Baumol, the study of all the actions that an entrepreneur can actively do, from 
vertical integration to the formation of a cartel, are what reserves the most interesting challenges for 
welfare economics. All those alternative occupations can produce a waste of resources, from the point 
of view of society. This topic is particularly important if we consider Baumol’s subsequent academic 
production. His papers on the role of the entrepreneur in the economy where considered pioneering in 
the field. He did not continue immediately with this line of research, his papers on the figure of 
entrepreneur will appear only in 1968, but the seeds are evident in this chapter4. He did not consider an 
                                                        
4 “Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 58, which begins with evokes 
the lines in …: “The entrepreneur is at the same time one of the most intriguing and one of the most elusive characters in 
the cast that constitutes the subject of economic analysis. He has long been recognized as the apex of the hierarchy that 
determinies the behavior of the firm and thereby bears a heavy responsibility for the vitality of the free enterprise society. In 
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abstract entrepreneur immersed in a context of perfect competition, but an actual strategist that may be 
moved by different objectives. The contrast between the common image of the entrepreneur as a man 
of power and the abstractness of the theories of the firm, where the entrepreneur is rarely mentioned 
or pictured as a “creature very intimdated by the circumstance” (Baumol 1965; 114), is present both in 
welfare economics and the theory of the state and in “Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory”: “The 
theoretical firm is entrepreneurless-the Prince of Denmark has been expunged from the discussion of 
Hamlet.” (Baumol 1968; 66). 
 
. The application of the externality argument and the lack of cooperation is then extended to a set 
of various problems, such as involuntary unemployment and international relations. The originality of 
Baumol’s exposition is that the intervention of the state is advocate because the lack of coordination 
brings a loss in welfare in terms of inability of fully pursuing private economic interest. In fact, the 
reasoning in analogous to the famous prisoner dilemma, a concept that was becoming more and 
more pervasive in the 1950s.  
 
2.3 The Economic Foundations of the Theory of the State 
To fully develop an economic theory of the state, Baumol had to confront with the long-
standing problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility. In fact, to establish that there have been a 
loss of welfare, it is first necessary to determine how this welfare is measured and confronted 
among individuals.  
Baumol made a review of the principal criteria to compare utilities available. He reviewed 
four different criteria:   Kaldor’s: Pareto optimality, Bergson’s social welfare function, Kaldor’s 
criterion and Scitovsky’s double criterion.  The Pareto optimum is a state of allocation of resources 
from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or preference criterion 
better off without making at least one individual or preference criterion worse off. The Bergson’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
the writings of the classical economist his appearance was frequent, though he remained a shadowy entity without clearly 
defined form and function.” (Baumol 1968; 64), 
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social welfare function was another way to approach welfare economic analysis. It is a function 
containing all the utilities of individuals with regards to specific goods and services. As for the 
Scitovsky’s double criterion, it was an attempt to overcome the contradiction of the Kaldor 
criterion that we have seen. Since it may happen that both the introduction of the invention and its 
elimination can be desirable for the Kaldor’s criterion, Scitovsky proposed that, to be acceptable, 
the introduction of the innovation should be Kaldor-acceptable, but not its elimination. 
He analysed with particular attention the criterion proposed by Kaldor in 1939. The reason 
is that he already made a comment on this criterion in 1946 with the paper “Community 
Indifference”, a comment that was in fact a sharp critique. He reprises this critique in the book, 
republishing entire parts of his 1946 article. Kaldor tried to construct a criterion to evaluate if a 
change in production, for example with the introduction of a new invention, is desirable in the 
sense that it enhances welfare without interpersonal comparison of utilities.  
Baumol’s main criticism is that the Kaldor’s criterion can provide sufficient conditions, but 
not foundations, for an economic optimum. The main weak point is that in Kaldor’s theory there is 
no need for the compensation between parts to be actually performed. Being the compensation 
totally abstract, it has no real impact on the situation and it is a sterile measure of welfare. 
Moreover, Kaldor is implicitly “subjected utility of the measuring rod of money, a measuring rod 
which bends and stretches, and ultimately falls to pieces in our hands” (Baumol 1952: 124). 
Scitovsky had already shown in 1941 that the Kaldor’s criterion can lead to contradictory results, for 
both the innovation and its removal can be “permitted reorganizations”, as the gain of innovations 
can be so huge that the gaining group can always compensate the other one. Kaldor replied in the 
same number of the Review of Economic Studies5. Since welfare depends on both production and 
distribution, it necessary to establish where political postulates come into play during welfare 
evaluations. The political postulates are involved only in questions concerning the distribution of 
income and not the production. If the production of welfare goes up, there is a certain distribution 
                                                        
5 Kaldor, N. (1946-47). [Community Indifference] A Comment. Review of Economic Studies, Vol. IX, No. I: 87 
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where every agent is better-off, but this does not imply that this distribution would be the most 
desirable. To make this statement, some “political postulates” are necessary, but those postulates 
and the policy can be separated by economics. Baumol recognized that the compensation criterion 
did not eliminate the interpersonal comparisons, since it used money and money can have different 
marginal utility for different individuals. Moreover, he understood that those compensations are not 
understandable outside an utilitaristic framework. (Baujard 2011; 33). The validity of Baumol’s 
critique was confirmed also in recent studies. Ian M.D. Little stated in an interview in 2005: “No, I 
don’t think that the contemporary debates about the compensation criterion added very much to 
the original Bill Baumol’s note. He was the first person I know of who said that hypothetical 
compensation was no criterion.” (Pattanaik et al.; 2005). The problem is that the task to find a 
criterion to compare utilities, or individuals, or to make welfare judgement is far more problematic 
than it seems. 
 
The difficulty stems from the fact that we have not discovered what may not be 
discoverable – an ‘objective’ criterion for an optimum distribution of income, and in any 
problems in the field of welfare economics we are therefore forced to take the distribution 
of income as a datum. [Baumol 1952: 125] 
 
Baumol recognized that there may be some unsolvable problems in economics, like the 
definition of a universal criterion for the distribution of income. The economic analysis sometimes 
has to deal with something that cannot be axiomatized or defined in a univocal way. Baumol’s 
solution is then to accept an imperfect criterion. 
It is important to highlight that those four criteria are quite similar, but Baumol stressed 
more the differences rather than the similarities. The Pareto optimum is a state of allocation of 
resources from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or preference 
criterion better off without making at least one individual or preference criterion worse off. The 
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Bergson’s social welfare function was another way to approach welfare economic analysis. It is a 
function containing all the utilities of individuals with regards to specific goods and services. As for 
the Scitovsky’s double criterion, it was an attempt to overcome the contradiction of the Kaldor 
criterion that we have seen. Since it may happen that both the introduction of the invention and its 
elimination can be desirable for the Kaldor’s criterion, Scitovsky proposed that, to be acceptable, 
the introduction of the innovation should be Kaldor-acceptable, but not its elimination. The limit 
of this criterion lie in the fact that in presence of intersecting utility possibility curves: in such 
situation, it is impossible to judge certain kind of changes in income distribution, so the criterion 
can not be used 
Which criterion shall we choose then? We have seen that Kaldor provided us with a necessary 
condition for a permitted reorganization, namely the necessity for a compensation, but this is not a 
sufficient condition. 
 
The best that can be done is to say that the problem is a political one and that it can be 
solved only by some sort of collective decision by the group. This answer obviously leaves 
much to be desired, but I can see no alternatives. […] In terms of the analysis at the end of 
the last section, I have just suggested that we must adopt either Pareto’s or Bergson’s 
criterion. […] For most of our arguments we have employed and shall employ no more 
than Pareto’s criterion. [Baumol 1952: 131] 
 
In sum, the problem is not solvable by the sole use of calculus. It is important to note that 
Baumol never refused the political dimension of welfare evaluation. The problem is ultimately a 
political one and it can not be reduced to pure calculations. This statement is interesting because 
Baumol is outlining the moment for the political reasoning. The economist should then consciously 
choose the criterion that is optimal for his analysis, with the assumptions and ethical postulates 
made clear.  
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2.4 The Historical Argument 
Baumol’s theory is in line with a stream of literature that relates with the relationship 
between economics and the government. The historical excursus includes authors like Petty, Smith, 
Storch and the German historical school. Baumol’s goal is to reforge the link between political 
economy, welfare analysis and the normative discourse on the theory of the state. A link that, in 
Baumol’s opinion, was lost with the Jevonsian revolution: 
 
With the Jevonsian revolution, French, Italian and English speaking authors were led, 
under the influence of positivist philosophy, to shy away from ethically normative 
discussion. […] Discussions on the functions of the state disappeared from writings on 
public finance which became confined to inquiries on how the costs involved in 
performance of these functions could be covered. Welfare economics has to some extent 
taken over the analysis of the economic functions of the government. Yet the approach of 
welfare economics is primarily a piecemeal one, and as a result the methods more than the 
conclusions of the theory of welfare have proved relevant for our present discussion. 
[Baumol 1952: 154-155] 
 
With the marginal revolution the economists were driven to use more mathematics into their 
analysis and that brought welfare economics to replace the thought on the economic functions of 
the government. However, welfare economics is a tool useful to analyze certain problems and not 
an end in itself. Welfare economics is not the conclusion, it is a method. This is also the link with 
the epilogue of the book, entitled “The Wreck of Welfare Economics?” and it contains Baumol’s 
opinions on welfare economics and its methodology. First, Baumol clarifies that the book does not 
give definitive answers, but the reader should not be discouraged. On the contrary, it was necessary 
to understand the limits of welfare economics in order to make it survive.   
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Nor must we be deceived into believing that we have found a meaningful conclusion if that 
conclusion is in the form: such and such is the case unless there are present important 
economies or diseconomies. This tells us merely that we have still not begun to investigate 
what they may be the most significant part of our problem. We have merely chosen to give 
our ignorance a local habitation and a name. [Baumol 1952; 165-166] 
 
The awareness of a limit is useful because it helps us to trace the status of our knowledge and in 
doing so, it highlights future lines of research. In this case it is the recognition that taking in 
consideration the role of externalities is the key to further developments of welfare economics. 
Baumol’s position on this matter is clear: welfare economics real function is to provide instruments 
useful for other fields.  
 
I sincerely believe that welfare theory even as it stands has an important contribution to 
make; for it can be most useful in rejecting shoddy arguments and easy fallacies, a role 
where help should always be welcome. As Professor Pigou once pointed out, abstract 
arguments, if they only construct empty boxes, cannot show what is (empirically) right, but 
can often (by demonstrating contradiction) indicate what is wrong and, perhaps, even more 
often, what is unproved. There can be little doubt that such service has proved invaluable 
in the past. Indeed, this possibility provides the main raison d’etre for this book. [Baumol 
1952: 167] 
 
The “empty boxes” refers to a quarrel between Clapham and Pigou on The Economic Journal in 1922 
regarding the practical utility of certain axioms of analytical economics6. The problem was the 
relationship between economic theory and its application to real cases. If welfare economics is a set 
                                                        
6 John Clapham (1873 – 1946) was a British economic historian.  
 21 
of “empty economics boxes”, this means that we can not apply it as it stands. Baumol’s answer to 
this problem is to recognize that welfare economics is not an end in itself, but it can be a 
meaningful tool for the applied analysis. This idea of welfare economics as a tool can be better 
appreciated if we consider Baumol’s book as part of the broader public economics field. In this 
sense it is clear that Baumol was compiling a case-by-case study founded on philosophical base and 
analyzed through the tools of welfare economics.  
 
 
3- An Offspring of the Welfare Economics Boom  
Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State received mixed reviews. The general opinion was 
that it was an important book for the welfare economics analysis, but since the field evolved very 
quickly, some of the contents were already old when it appeared on the shelves. Another recurring 
comment is the fact that the book contains very interesting topics, but they are treated with 
insufficient means to be fully appreciable and in general the thesis is not developed to its full 
potential. Especially in the second part of the book the reader has the feeling that he stopped, leaving 
the reader with the curiosity to know more. Another common comment is that the book can serve 
to be a great textbook for the richness of contents and the mastery of exposition. 
K.E. Boulding (1953) highlighted three elements: “and the book suffers because the rapid 
development of welfare economics makes the writing of even three or four years ago seem a little 
out of date.” (Boulding 1953: 210) and that the book seemed a little bit outdated and that “It suffers 
also from a common defect of published theses-it is too much of a text book for a treatise and too 
much of a treatise to be a text” (Boulding 1953: 210). The second one is that some solutions are not 
entirely original or new “Baumol comes to the not wholly surprising solution that the only remedy 
for this situation is government, a conclusion which, if I remember rightly, Mr. Hobbes came to 
quite sometimes ago” (Boulding 1953: 210). The third is the lack of use of mathematics. In his 
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opinion the introduction of mathematics could have saved welfare economics from the “wreck” 
described in the last chapter.  
Ian M.D. Little (1953) shared much of the Boulding’s opinions. In particular, Little stressed 
the weakness of the second part of the book: Baumol had made a great effort to integrate 
economics, politics and sociology in one theory, but he did not go far enough, he did not make the 
best out of it. “I wish he had written a larger book on the main theme […] If he does not do so 
himself, someone else should, with suitable acknowledgments” (Little 1953: 80).  
M. W. Reder (1953) is even more critical. The book is full of interesting arguments, but they 
seemed outdated when the book appeared, since welfare economics was “subject to rapid 
obsolescence” (Reder 1953: 538). However, the book contains some interesting suggestions, like the 
part on monopolies and the interrelation between individual and group maximization in Chapter 
ten. The most disappointing part is again the last part of the book. While the discussion on the 
various criteria to compare utilities is quite appreciated, Chapter twelve is considered unsatisfying 
for two reasons. First, for the absence of reference to Arrow’s link between welfare economics and 
the state. Second, for his methodology: instead of using new tools, he simply exposed a set of 
quotation from other authors. “In my opinion, this approach does not go to the heart of the 
matter- the constraints imposed by political considerations upon the (presumed) desire of political 
authorities to optimize the utilization of productive resources.” (Reder 1953: 539). The final 
criticism is that Baumol did not include in his analysis organized groups of individuals, but only 
individuals as singles. This brings to an overestimation of the role of the state and it is not clear 
which kind of optima is possible to attain. 
R. W. Pfouts (1953) contended the use of the community indifference curves as a tool for 
welfare analysis7. The various analyses of the set of particular cases when the self-interest actions of 
the individuals affect the group welfare are too brief and sometimes the reasoning is not carried out 
in a plain way. However, he appreciated the fact that Baumol quoted many classical writers who 
                                                        
7 Ralph William Pfouts (1920 – 2014) was an American economist, professor at University of North Carolina. 
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have made theories on the same subject. “There seems to be no question that present-day writers, 
including Baumol, see more deeply into the problems of political economy economics than did the 
classical writers. It is pleasant to encounter writer who cheerfully admits that he gains his increased 
vision the shoulders of the classical giants” (Pfouts 189: 1953). Robert H. Strotz (1954) had a more 
positive view of Baumol book8. The book has the quality to bring together many different 
discourses that are often seen as disconnected. However, Strotz lamented the lack of mathematical 
content and the fact that some reasoning that should have been supported by empirical arguments 
are carried out only at the theoretical level. Stortz suggested to use the book as a textbook, since 
Baumol has a great expository ability and the book is a good sum of the welfare economics theory.  
Frank Hahn (1954) saw in Baumol’s interest for welfare economics an “offspring” of the 
welfare economics boom of “a few years ago”9. The delay in publication of the Ph.D. thesis had 
caused the book to seem outdated. However, Baumol’s book contains some “substantial 
contributions” to the late 1940s to the welfare debate. Before publishing his review, he sent his 
impressions to Baumol: 
 
The reason for writing so short a note is to crave your indulgence. The E.J. has asked me 
to review your Welfare book. I foolishly said yes. The point now is, that while I think that 
you have a number of good points, I cannot get myself to really like the book. I think this 
is due to the fact that it contains so much of what we thought important in 1947-48, which 
is no longer the same as what we find important today. In any case while the review I have 
written is by no means nasty it is lukewarm. I hope that you will not regard this as a dirty 
trick or lack of friendship. Having said yes to reviewing it (before I had read it) I don’t see 
                                                        
8 Robert Henry Strotz (1922 –1994) was an American economist. He obtained his Ph.D. from the University of 
Chicago in 1951 with a thesis on welfare economics.  
9 Frank Horace Hahn (1925 – 2013) was a British economist. He took a doctoral degree in 1951 from the LSE, 
where presumably he met Baumol.  
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how I can now get out of it. All I can do now is to assure you my continuing love and 
respect.10 [Hahn 1953] 
 
 Hahn did not lighten his critique because he was Baumol’s friend, in fact in the official review there 





Given Baumol’s inclination for the applied economics and the rapid transformations of 
welfare economics field, it is not by chance, then, that after the 1950s he started to diversify his 
production in a consistent way. However, the idea that the only way for make welfare economics to 
survive is to apply its theories to concrete cases is evident in many papers. In a letter to Jan 
Timbergen in 1953 he wrote: “Thank you very much for the draft of your paper, ‘More realism in 
Welfare Economics.’ I certainly agree that more definition on our ethical preconceptions and more 
empirical work (and particularly the latter) is necessary if we are to get out of the impasse which 
now faces us in this field” (Baumol 1953)11. It is important to remember that the field of welfare 
economics was in deep trouble during the 1950s. Baumol seemed aware of the troubles of the field, 
but he always maintained a positive view of this field and the positivity derived directly from his 
personal view of welfare economics.  
Baumol explains what was the difference between the debate of the 1940s and the recent 
developments in welfare economics: scholars of the previous decade were engaged in a “profound 
methodological soul-searching rather than a quest of directly applicable results.” (Baumol 1965; 2). 
However, this search was not successful, and “As the failure to establish a methodology which was 
                                                        
10 Letter from Hahn to Baumol, September 22nd 1953, Box 83 
11 Letter to Tinbergen March 31, 1953 
 25 
both fruitful and logic tight became increasingly obvious, gloom descended upon the writers of the 
forties. There soon appeared statements about the significance of welfare economics which bore an 
ill-concealed resemblance to obituary notices” (Baumol 1959: 317). However, Baumol’s opinion is 
that welfare economics is not dead, but its role is different from what the writers of the 1940s have 
thought:   
 
Happily, reports of the death of welfare economics turned out to be exaggerated. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the discipline is now a vigorous contributor to a type of investigation which is, 
however, totally different in spirit. Welfare economics has come to play a role in the 
intensely practical and applied field of operations research which may be described roughly 
as the application of mathematical methods to business, governmental and military 
problems. [Baumol 1959: 317-318] 
 
This is the same position of the 1952 book. Baumol was well aware of the problems of welfare 
economics after the 1950s. However, he did not consider the field as dead, because welfare 
economics can be used as a tool and be integrated in other economic disciplines. This has 
implications also for the role of the welfare economist. It is useful to compare two quotations from 
different papers.  First, Baumol’s paper “Monopolistic Competition and Welfare Economics” 
(1964) begins with a polemical remark about the role of the welfare economist:  
 
For in recent years it has become unfashionable for the welfare economist to speak about 
anything so substantive. Rather, he has grown exceedingly introspective and has been 
spending much of his time determining the circumstances under which he has any right to 
speak at all. [Baumol 1964: 44] 
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The second statement comes from Baumol’s paper, "Informed Judgment, Rigorous Theory and 
Public Policy" (1965), in which he analyzed the relationship between the applied economist and the 
theoretical economist. The paper analyses some theoretical results that have some important 
consequences for public policies, confuting the common belief that only the applied economist can 
provide useful insight for the policy maker. He writes: “The welfare theorist is and should be by 
nature a trouble maker who disturbs calm waters. His constitution requires him to question what is 
accepted and to cast doubt on the standard operating procedures” (Baumol 1965: 138). Those two 
quotes remind of the epilogue of his book, in which Baumol said that the role of welfare economics 
is to prove what is wrong. Despite the transformations of welfare economics, the welfare economist 
still has an important role to play in the policy-making. 
Those papers show how Baumol’s idea of welfare economics as an applied tool remained 
unaltered in the years between the two editions of Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State. This is 
coherent with the transformations that the entire discipline of economics was undergoing in those 
years, and also with Baumol’s view of economics as an intrinsic applied subject. Not that theory 
should be disregarded, but the theory should always find its application to the concrete world.  
 
 
5- The Second Edition and Its Disappearance  
5.1 New Developments  
The idea of the application of welfare economics tools to concrete cases is fully articulated 
in the second edition of Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, published in 1965. In the preface 
Baumol explained that it was almost impossible to find a copy of the book, so it was the right 
moment for a reprint. However, he did not want to revise the previous book and that is why he 
added the new introduction without making modifications to the 1952 text. However, Baumol 
recognized that he changed during the fifteen years that separates the first edition from the second: 
“In short, I feel that I am a different person from the author of the original edition of this book and 
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that my right to tamper with my predecessor’s work is questionable” (Baumol 1965: IX). He 
stressed that the introduction will focus on what he considers the most significant developments in 
welfare economics, namely its effective application to several problems of policy making: 
 
From there it turns to the most significant subject-matter of the interim period, the 
application of welfare economics to a variety of concrete problems of public policy. This 
work showed that the abstractions of welfare economist could serve some function outside 
the ivory tower and that they could offer significant assistance to the policy maker, the 
practical man of action. [Baumol 1965: 1] 
 
The goal of the introduction is to show the major developments in literature that are 
somehow linked with the core themes of the 1952 book and to prove that the most significative 
developments of welfare economics were in the applied field. He reprised the review of Theoretical 
Welfare Economics by J. de V. Graaff (1957) to show the difference between the methodological 
debate of the 1940s and the applied developments that he will explain. The introduction is 
interesting also to understand how Baumol’s book was situated in the debate and if some new 
contributions explicitly referred to Baumol’s analysis.  
One of the first examples of those effective applications is the cost-benefit analysis. The 
“benefit-cost” analysis is immediately opposed to the “rules of thumb” of the Chicago school. The 
former, in fact, can bring a rigorous method not only to the management of firms, but also in all 
those situations where it is necessary to make long-run decisions. Baumol did not go into detail. 
Baumol praised cost-benefit analysis because, in the face of the difficulties of applying the abstract 
concepts of welfare economics to concrete cases, it. “breathed life into many of our welfare 
constructs” (Baumol 1965, 23). The metaphor underlines Baumol’s view that theoretical welfare 
economics had been on the brink of death.  
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Baumol included a discussion of the meaning of externality only in the second edition, 
justified by the fact that “the entire subject was re-examined from his very foundations” (Baumol 
1965: 24). His definition combined various elements. In the first place there must be the 
interdependence between economic activities, with the lack of compensation for the effects of 
someone’s activity on others. Since here it is nothing more than the notion of externality proposed 
by Pigou, but the problem with this definition is that it is too broad. So Baumol added a second 
element: we are in presence of externality if an activity’s marginal social net benefit is greater than 
its marginal private return. This implies the necessity to know with a considerable precision how the 
utilities of different individuals are affected by the activities of others and vice versa. Only in this 
way it is possible to determine if an external effect is in effect an externality. The lack of a 
mathematical tool that could serve this job is fulfilled by Buchanan and Stubblebine and their 
“Pareto-relevant externality”, an algebraic tool that defined the externality in terms of differences in 
derivatives12.  
There is again no discussion about Arrow’s Social Choices and Individual Values. This time 
Baumol could not avoid the confrontation with Arrow’s work, but his view remained almost 
unchanged, because the reason he gave are that the content of the book can not be summarized 
briefly and that Arrow’s conclusions do not affect his discourse, a statement that we have seen 
above in his review to Arrow’s book. 
 
5.2 Liberals vs Conservatives 
The tension between the advocates of the state intervention in the economy and those who 
oppose it is a common feature of democracy. Baumol showed this contraposition between those 
who sought the State intervention and those who did not based on the role of externalities. On the 
                                                        
12 Buchanan, J. and Stubblebine, W C. (1962). Externality. Economica, vol. 29. 
James McGill Buchanan Jr. (1919 –2013) was an American economist, he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Sciences in 1986. 
William Craig Stubblebine (1936 - ) is an American economist, he works in the field of public policy. 
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side of the liberals there is Ronald Coase and his paper “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960)13. 
Coase confronted with the problem of externalities in a different way with respect to his 
predecessors. The intervention of the state may reduce the utility of who is producing the 
externalities, moving in fact to another non-optimal situation in Paretian terms. Thus, the 
government intervention is “overstated” and “oversold”. On the other side, among the 
conservatives, there is Scitovsky with “On the Principle of Consumer Sovereignty” (1962). The 
relation between them lies on the role of the state that those two papers advocates, although for 
different reasons. Scitovsky did not approve the concept of consumer sovereignty, because, in his 
opinion, it leads to vulgare tastes and bad decisions. The government should be the guard of the 
good tastes against the vulgarity. The government intervention should aim at limit the vulgar 
derives of the consumer sovereignty. Baumol’s preferred “to take the unexciting middle position 
between these two extremes” (Baumol 1965: 29). He disagreed with Scitovsky, since his method 
could be a dangerous vehicle for impositions: a small élite could easily impose its rules or tastes. On 
the other hand, he agreed with Coase, but he also thought that “he exaggerates greatly both the 
seriousness of the drawbacks of governmental activity and the extent of the naiveté of economists 
on this subject” (Baumol 1965: 29).  
The critique of Scitovsky’s position raised some criticism. Karl de Schweiniz, professor of 
Economics at the Northwestern University, wrote a letter to Baumol with a series of comments, 
mainly on the section on the general policy implications of externalities. His thesis is that in 
comparing Coase and Scitovsky Baumol is no longer talking about externalities, but “whose 
preferences ought to be maximized.” Scitovsky is arguing on the fact that consumer sovereignty 
leads to the proliferation of bad tastes, that has nothing to do with externalities: “But surely the 
hypothetical existence of a superior product does not mean that the existing output generates 
externalities”.  
                                                        
13 Ronald Harry Coase (1910 – 2013) was a British economist, Professor of Economics at the University of 
Chicago Law School. 
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In sum, the problem posed by Scitovsky is separable from the externalities. De Schweiniz 
also suggested that, while he is in accordance with Baumol’s view, he did not think that his position 
is ‘unexciting middle position’ ”, but he is openly against Scitovsky. Baumol replied on March 18th, 
1966. He agreed with the remarks of de Schweiniz, that he had little sympathy for Scitovsky’s 
position, but for different reasons:  
 
I certainly agree that bad movies do not involve any externalities, at least do not necessarily 
do so. And that is precisely why I have relatively little sympathy for Scitovsky’s position. I 
am arguing then that there is no obvious ground for intervention to eliminate the 
production of bad movies, whereas in the case of externalities, one should consider 
intervening precisely because their presence prevents true consumer sovereignty from 
taking effect. For the present I think that one cannot really separate out the argument for 
intervention in the presence of externalities and the issue of consumer sovereignty. It 
seems to me that to the economist one cannot argue that externalities are bad per se. They 
are bad because they lead consumers to act in a manner which frustrates one another’s 
desire. [Baumol 1966] 
 
This is an important clarification. He did not like Scitovsky’s position because not only it 
has nothing to do with externalities and it is extremely dangerous. Bad tastes may become an issue 
when they influence in a bad way someone else’s life, or when they prevent someone to pursue his 
own interests. Here the two arguments coincide: externalities are a problem because they prevent 






5.3 Other Theories of The State 
There are two contributions that explicitly refer to Baumol’s theory of the State. One is the 
book by Anthony Downs14. In An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) Downs formulated a 
behavioral theory of government activity. In particular, Downs criticized Baumol’s approach to the 
state, since it is not true that the government undertakes only those activities with indivisible 
benefits. Downs put himself in contrast with Baumol and Samuelson on the role of government 
intervention. For Baumol this quarrel does not make sense, since he and Samuelson are concerned 
with the normative aspect of the analysis, while Down with a more positive analysis (Baumol 1965; 
41, note).  
The second one is the contribution by Buchanan and Tullock (1962)15. In their book The 
Calculus of Consent they referred to Baumol’s book of 1952 as a rare example of someone who 
discussed carefully the question on the emergence of democratic political institutions: “The 
relatively recent work of William J. Baumol represents almost the only attempt to develop a theory 
of collective activity from the economic calculus of the individual citizen.” (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962: 321, 322). They explicitly consider their work as an extension of Baumol’s book: they apply 
the externality argument to the problem of choosing the decision-making rules and they studied the 
economic approach contained in the alternatives open for choice. Baumol recognized that their 
work was indeed an extension of his own argument, but he did not agree on a set of arguments. He 
did not agree, for example, on the fact that only a rule which requires unanimous consent for any 
governmental action can lead to optimal results (Baumol 1965; 43).  
For Buchanan and Tullock, the collective decision-making can always present external costs 
if the process is not unanimous, because the controlling group is always able to approve legislations 
with deleterious effects on others. Baumol thought, on the contrary, that unanimity is an ideal 
instrument to preserve externalities (Baumol 1965; 44). Every voting rules specifies the ratio 
                                                        
14 Anthony Downs (1930 - ) is an American economist, expert in public policy and public administration. 
15 Gordon Tullock (1922 – 2014) was an American economist known for his work on public choice theory. 
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necessary to approve the change, but also the groups that can prevent the changes. The line 
between imposing costs on others and preventing costs on others is very thin. More directly related 
with Baumol’s discourse is Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action (1965), whom he quoted also 
in the 1984 article. Olson’s starting point is basically the same of Baumol’s: without regulatory 
intervention, the un-coordinated activity of individual may fail to achieve the goals of the members 
of the group. The other argument is that even if there’s coordination, the costs of this coordinating 
activity may rise substantially. This is a natural complement to Baumol’s main argument in the 1952 
edition.   
 
In sum, the introduction of the second edition is not only a dense and articulate literature 
review of the relevant contributions to welfare economics in the years between the two editions, but 
it enforces Baumol’s view of welfare economics as a tool to be employed in various economic 
fields. “The overall conclusion which we can draw is that there is a great vitality in the field of 
welfare economics, which despite fluctuations in the activity of its investigators, occasional 
reductions in the rate of progress and isolated periods of pessimism, remains an area of continuing 
interest and applicability” (Baumol 1965, 45). This optimism is a characteristic of Baumol’s thought. 
Baumol saw the end of a period, the methodological and theoretical debate of the 1940s, and the 
beginning to another one, the applied side of welfare economics of the 1950s. He never rejected 
welfare economics as “dead”. His faith in the progress of economics as a science made him to 
remain positive on the fate of the discipline.  
 
5.4 The Last Edition 
Welfare economics and the theory of the State is a book that aged faster than expected16. The 
reasons are threefold. First, there is the rapid transformation that welfare economics underwent 
                                                        
16 Robert Solo in a letter to Baumol about the first edition wrote: “It is destined to became, I am sure, increasingly 
important as time goes on” (Solo 1953). 
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since the 1950s and after the 1970s, that made the content of the book outdated. Second, the 
publication delay between the thesis and the book overlapped with the storm caused by Arrow’s 
1951 book. The fact that Baumol did not discuss Arrow’s contribution must have given the 
impression that the author was not updated with the new developments of the field. Third, Baumol 
used some tools that were already obsolete at the time of the first edition, like the community 
indifference map, i.e a map of indifference curves for the collectivity. Baumol had already analyzed 
this tool in an article of 1949, “Community Indifference Map: A Construction”, so he was familiar 
with it and that is probably why he used such a device17. However, the book was considered very 
useful for didactic purposes, since it presents a great sum of the relevant debates in welfare 
economics of the 1940s. Atkinson listed Baumol’s book as one of the must-read for students in the 
1960s: “In the 1960, welfare economics was an integral part of the discipline. Students were 
expected to study books such Little (1957), Baumol (1965), or Graaff (1957).” (Atkinson 2001, 
194)18. 
There are several correspondence exchanges with publication officers and editors about the 
rights of the book and the possibility of a reprint. In a letter of 1981, Mr. P.D.C. Davis, Publication 
Officer at LSE, informed Baumol of the impossibility to keep selling Welfare Economics and the Theory 
of the State. The book sold “less than 20 copies per year” and the remaining copies were thus moved 
to the Economist’s Bookshop, owned by the LSE. In the response, Baumol wrote: “[…] Obviously, 
as it must to all things, the end of this book has finally come.” (Baumol 1981). He seemed to 
recognize that the cultural environment around him had definitively changed and that his book 
belonged to a different period. In 1986, a letter from Margaret Hivnor19, Paperback Editor at the 
University of Chicago Press, informed Baumol that Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State would 
                                                        
17 The community indifference curve is constructed considering the various set of compensations payed between 
the agents of the economy and aggregating the preferences of the individuals. The difference with respect to Kaldor is that 
Baumol considered an essential part of the construction of those curves the specification of the mean for actual 
compensations between agents. 
18 Sir Anthony Barnes Atkinson (1944 – 2017) was a British economist. 
19 Letter April 4th 1986, Baumol’s Collection Box 8 
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not have been reprinted anymore. The rights were returned to Baumol in January, when Davis, the 
Publication Officer at LSE, told him that the microfilm of the book was no longer available, 
probably because it was destroyed. 
 
When I first wrote to you, I did think we would decide to reprint: Geoffrey Huck, our 
Economics Editor, was enthusiastic at the idea of adding a book by yourself to our list, and 
Professor Russell Hardin of the Political Science Department here had urged to make 
WELFARE ECONOMICS available to students.  
The book appealed to us, too, as a classic study with a point of view different from that of 
so many of our economics books.  
For the past two months, however, I’ve received the same advice from every scholar in 
economics and political science I’ve gone to. WELFARE ECONOMICS is universally 
praised and considered important from in historical point of view, but would not sell in a 
new edition. One professor told me he thought students should want to read it, but didn’t 
think they would. [Hivnor, 1986] 
 
After the publication of the second edition, Baumol did not comment again on his book, nor he 
returned directly on the topics. One of the last letters he received concerning Welfare Economics and 
the Theory of the State was from a French scholar, J. M. Boisson in 1970. The question was about the 
third paragraph of Chapter four, where Baumol discussed the system of taxes and subsidies 
necessary to solve the problem of misallocation of resources. Baumol wrote that the ideal output 
can be reached in three ways: by a system of taxes alone, by a system of subsidies alone and by a 
mix of taxes and subsidies where taxes and subsidies are of the same amount. In other words, tax 
and subsidies can be interchangeable measures for correcting a misallocation of resources. Boisson 
asked why Baumol thought that taxes and subsidies are interchangeable tools to solve the problem 
of misallocation of resources. Baumol replied on March 24th 1970: “I think I know [sic] longer agree 
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with what I said there. It is no longer clear to me that the same general equilibrium resources 
allocation results can be achieved by the two methods, and that my comment is simply a 
consequence of sloppy thinking.” This is one of the rare letters where not only he commented his 
book, but he disagreed with what he wrote. Baumol wrote to Boisson that he drafted a paper that 
touches this problem and the result from this new analysis is that it is not possible to have a choice 
between the two methods. Baumol said that the paper was not yet typed and he did not provide the 
title. This is the last letter in the archives that concerns Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State and 





Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State was an attempt to provide an original contribution 
to the welfare economic field and to shed light on the externalities problem. However, what 
remains of Baumol’s welfare economics production from 1940s to 1960s is a view of the field 
rather than a complete theory. In considering welfare economics as a tool, Baumol seemed to 
anticipate the empirical turn described by Backhouse and Cherrier (2017). They describe “The 
1950s and 1960s could be described as the age of the economic theorist” (Backhouse 2017; 35), 
with a gradual shift toward more empirical research, boosted by the development of new 
econometric and computational technique. Baumol intended “applied” as a mix of theory and 
practice and the public economics field was the right one to implement this vision. “Applied work 
was perceived to need a theoretical basis, with econometrics being used to test formally specified 
theoretical hypotheses. Several fields, such as development and public economics, were reshaped 
around the neoclassical theoretical core.” (Backhouse 2017; 35). 
 It is important to remark that welfare economics did not completely disappear from 
Baumol’s writing. In 2001 he edited together with Charles Wilson a three volumes collection of the 
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major writing in welfare economics. Some papers by Baumol are reprinted in those volumes, but 
they are all very technical papers written after the 1970s. They reprise some topics of the 1950s’ 
writings, but their style is very different.  
Baumol’s contributions in welfare economics can be better appreciated if we broaden our 
perspective and consider them with respect of the whole field of public economics. Welfare 
Economics and the Theory of the State was one of those “crossing traditions” text that built up from the 
British tradition of public economics and mixed different backgrounds in order to assess problems 
that were ignored by the mainstream literature. His use of case-by-case scenarios and history is in 
line with the British tradition, but his book was very important for the development of public 
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The Journal of Economic Literature hosted a debate on the transformation problem between 
William Baumol, Paul Samuelson and Morishima Michio in 1974. The papers published in the colloquium 
are actually the result of an intense exchange of letters that started in 1973 and involved many other 
economists, like Martin Bronfenbrenner and Robert Dorfman. This research reconstructs the 
formation of the JEL papers using the unpublished letters between the actors involved with particular 
focus on Baumol and Samuelson. What emerges is that their correspondence was a clash between two 
different approaches to the history of economic thought: while Samuelson applied his “Whig” 
interpretation of history of economics, for Baumol it was a matter of understanding what an author 
tried to accomplish. This determines a different reading of Marx’s theories and a different 
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1. The Transformation Problem Strikes Back 
The transformation problem is a long-standing problem of economic theory. Many pages have 
been written about it, but its resolution is more a matter of faith than an objective reality. In the Journal 
of Economic Literature in 1974 there have been a curious exchange of papers between William J. Baumol, 
Paul Samuelson and Morishima Michio. The object of dispute was “what Marx really meant” by the 
transformation problem. In particular, Baumol claimed to have discovered Marx’s true intentions, i.e. 
that Marx wanted to transform values into profits, interest and rents, and not into prices. Samuelson 
and Morishima responded to Baumol’s paper with their own original contributions, in what came to be 
an animated back and forth. What is less known is that those four papers were the result of an intense 
exchange of letter that lasted almost a year and that involved many other economists. This paper 
reconstructs the unpublished debates behind the published papers and gives also and account of the 
debates that it generated after the publication. The main source are the unpublished letters between the 
economists involved, collected at the Economists’ Papers Archive at Duke University between four 
different collections. 
The debate on the JEL and the correspondence behind the published papers are also a clash 
between two different approaches to the history of economic thought. Baumol and Samuelson 
demonstrated to have opposite visions of the history of ideas: Samuelson showed the preludes of his 
“Whig” history of economics, i.e. that the new economic ideas encompass and improve better ones. 
For Baumol, on the other hand, it is important to evaluate an author’s thought by considering his 
whole intentions, production and historical circumstances. Baumol’s paper, and the debate that 
generated, raises the problem of the correct interpretation of Marx and, implicitly, of his correct place 
in the history of ideas. The two different approaches to the history of economic thought determined 





1.1 A Brief History of the Transformation Problem 
The transformation problem, or the transformation of values into prices, is the problem of 
finding a general rule by which to transform the values of commodities into the competitive prices of 
the market. In a capitalistic economy, commodities are just a part of a generic richness, since the 
richness itself is made of objectified labor and commodities are objectivation of the abstract labor. If it 
were possible to demonstrate that the production prices, if they do not coincide with values, can 
nevertheless be deduced by them and only by them, then it would have been possible to demonstrate 
that the elements that are characteristic of the economic theory, i.e. the prices, confirm all the theories 
of exploitation and alienation.  
In Volume I of Capital, Marx developed the analysis of the market as if the law of value was 
linked to the prices of commodities. However, this is true if the organic composition of capital is the 
same in all industries, which is an unrealistic hypothesis. For Marx’s critics this fact was used as the first 
argument to demonstrate that the theory of value was false, because it could not be linked to any real 
phenomenon of production. Problems arise also because competition should imply a uniform rate of 
exploitation, since workers can move from one occupation to another. However, this does not imply 
that competition will equal organic composition of capital, the assumption necessary for the 
transformation algorithm to be performed.  
The labor theory of value implies that commodities exchanged in proportion to their embodied 
labor and since Marx arrived at the equation r = s/v/(1 + c/v), there will be no tendency to equalize 
the rate of profit. It is necessary, then, to explain the deviation of the competitive prices from the 
values of commodities. It is well known and recognized that Marx failed in reconcile those two aspects. 
Moreover, in his price scheme, the constant capital and the variable capital used in production are 
expressed in value terms. Outputs, on the other hand, are expressed in price terms. From the basic 
notions of mathematics, in order to make calculations with different variables, they must be expressed 
in the same unit terms. In this case, both the capital and the output should be expressed in price terms.  
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Since Marx’s solution was wrong, it remained the question of the solvability of the 
transformation problem and a number of economists along the decades have tried to solve it. However, 
there were two tendencies among economists with regard to this problem. The first one was to try to 
mathematically solve it. The second one was to prove that it was not possible to coherently solve it, 
hence to demonstrate that Marx’s value theory was a wrong theory.  
Bortkiewicz used the same model of Marx, but with three sectors and he used this scheme the 
simple reproduction. Winternitz then noticed an error, i.e. that the transformation process must hold 
no matter what the conditions for reproduction are. He reformulated the problem starting from the 
balance equations of each sector. Seton (1957) noticed that Winternitz’s method was still incomplete. 
He then rewrote the problem in terms of the single commodity and not in aggregated terms. In doing 
so, he reprised Marx’s original setting of the problem and he gave in fact, a solution. However, it is 
worth noting that Seton’s solution is very similar to Sraffa’s 1960 solution, contained in the book 
Production of Commodity by means of Commodity. Dobb recognized that Sraffa provided a valid solution of 
the transformation problem, but in Sraffa’s solution, the values of commodities disappear from the 
calculus. So even after Sraffa, the exact meaning of the transformation problem remained something 
still debated.  
 
1.2 Samuelson’s Eraser 
In order to better understand the 1974 debate, it is useful to look back at another specific 
debate on the same problem, which can be legitimately considered the prodrome of this story. It started 
with two papers by Paul Samuelson: the first one is “The ‘Transformation’ from Marxian ‘Values’ to 
Competitive ‘Prices’: A Process of Rejection and Replacement” published in the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America in 1970. In this short paper, Samuelson showed 
how the transformation problem is mathematically inconsistent. The core argument is that values and 
prices are mutually exclusive, therefore it is not possible to go from values to competitive prices. In 
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other words, it is not necessary to analyze the surplus-values in order to analyze profits in a competitive 
economy.  He crystallized this concept with the famous eraser metaphor:  
 
In summary, ‘transforming’ from values to prices can be described logically as the 
following procedure: "(1) Write down the value relations; (2) take an eraser and rub them 
out; (3) finally write down the price relations-thus completing the so-called transformation 
process. [Samuelson 1970; 425] 
 
The second and most famous paper was “Understanding the Marxian Notion of Exploitation: 
A Summary of the So-Called Transformation Problem Between Marxian Values and Competitive 
Prices” published in the Journal of Economic Literature in the June 1971 issue. This paper explored the 
history of the transformation problem, the many attempts made by economists to solve it and provides 
Samuelson’s solution to the problem, in order to give the last word on this issue. It raised a number of 
replies and critiques. Many economists either accused Samuelson of misinterpretation of Marxism (like 
Martin Bronfenbrenner) or to have been too kind with Marx’s theory (for example, Abba Lerner).  
Despite the numerous critiques, Samuelson’s papers were still an important reference for 
Marxian discussions in the years immediately after their publication. It is in this conceptual context that 
Baumol entered in the debate with his personal contribution.  
 
2. Baumol’s Discovery 
Baumol’s interest for Marxian issues had a long history. He was not a first-time reader of Marx: 
both his parents were Marxist and he read Marx during his adolescence. In a letter dated February 18th, 
1951 he stated: “[…] I know Marx too well. I have read more on Marx of any member of the staff at 
either London or Princeton (and I include Viner), including the three volumes.” (Baumol 1951)20. 
However, Baumol said that the idea for the paper on the transformation problem came from the 
                                                        
20 Letter from Baumol to Raymond and Sophie, February 18th, 1951. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare 
Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 56.  
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questions he had from the students during a lesson. He taught history of economic thought at 
Princeton after the Seventies and Eighties, and Marx was part of the program.  
While Samuelson’s approach to the history of economic thought has been analyzed and 
commented by many authors (for example Boettke et al. 2014, Medema and Waterman 2015, 
Weintraub 2015), there is no literature about Baumol as an historian of economic thought. Beside 
teaching it, Baumol wrote extensively on the history of economics ideas during his career, spacing from 
Classical authors to modern economics. What emerges from this correspondence (which is not the sole 
they had  on the  history of ideas) is that Baumol and Samuelson had two opposite visions of the 
history of economic ideas.  
Samuelson occupies a controversial place among historians of economics. Because 
of his vision of the conceptual unity of all economic analysis, his historiographic method 
when reaching deep into the past was to formalize the analysis of his predecessors (and he 
saw them as such) using modern mathematical tools and theoretical constructs. Contextual 
elements such as historical background, influences, and ideology – important to most other 
historians – were ruthlessly ignored. (Medema and Waterman 2015; 5). 
 
Baumol’s approach can be considered the exact opposite of Samuelson’s vision of “conceptual 
unity”. Baumol never formalized his approach to the history of economic thought, but through the 
letters is clear that for him the “historical background, influences, and ideology” can not be ignored, 
but are an important part of the historical narrative. Despite he considered the interest for the history 
of economic thought as a “idle curiosity” (quoting Viner) and he stated that he did research in 
economic thought because his “early concerns with the writings of Karl Marx and Engels” (Baumol 
2001; 224), he showed to have at least two more reason to keep doing research in that field. First, 
“fields that are constantly coming up with new ideas, such as physics, pay very little attention to their 
own history. It’s only in fields where progress is slow and difficult that you spend much time worrying 
about predecessors.” (in Krueger 2001; 224). Second, for him the history of economic ideas is pervaded 
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by ambiguity and “the persistence of discussions about what Ricardo or Marx really meant shows how 
imperfect is the economist’s ability to preclude diversity of interpretation of what they have written.” 
(Baumol 1983; 9). It is the task of the economic historian to try to explain those ambiguities, but 
without forgetting the whole historical context. 
In the paper draft of 1973, Baumol claimed to have discovered “What Marx Really Meant” as 
he titled the paper, a reference to those ambiguities that for him surrounded the Classical economists. 
Baumol’s argument was that Marx never intended to transform values into prices, but instead he 
wanted to transform values into profits, interests and rents. The transformation problem becomes then 
a sequel of Marx’s value theory and it is intended to explain how non-wage incomes are produced. This 
interpretation has an important consequence for those, like Samuelson, who considered Marx a failed 
economist.  
The first letter between Baumol and Samuelson on this topic is dated March 5th, 1973: “Since I 
am quibbling with you may I ask for any comments?” (Baumol 1973)21. From this line it seems that 
Samuelson already knew Baumol’s paper and that they already had some form of disagreement on the 
content. The subject also started to attract the attention of other people: Samuelson travelled to Japan 
during March and there he met Martin Bronfenbrenner, who was visiting professor at Tokyo’s 
Wesleyan University. Samuelson told him about Baumol’s work and Bronfenbrenner sent a letter to 
Baumol asking to read the paper. Baumol’s reply to him showed how he was very confident of his 
findings: “The rumors you heard are right. I am virtually the only one who understands what Karl Marx 
really meant! However, I am indeed willing to share a revelation.”. (Baumol, 1973)22. 
In the same period, Baumol wrote to Mark Perlman, editor of the JEL, revealing that he was 
working on a paper on Marx and that he had discovered a hidden truth. Baumol highlighted that his 
                                                        
21 Letter from Baumol to Samuelson, March 5th 1973. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & 
Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 62. 
22 Letter from Baumol to Bronfenbrenner April 5 6 (?), 1973. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & 
Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 62 
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work had nothing to do with the Samuelson’s 1971 paper, but it indeed would help to clarify some 
aspects of Marx’s true intentions23.   
 
2.1 Baumol and Samuelson on Marx’s True Intentions 
 The first round of letters shows how different visions of the history of ideas can lead to 
completely different interpretations of the same author.  
The main cause for disagreement between Baumol and Samuelson was Marx’s true intentions in 
formulating the transformation problem. For Samuelson, Baumol’s argument on Marx’s intentions was 
the same of Ronald Meek: Meek believed that the analysis of surplus value explained the 
macroeconomic total of surplus. This surplus then is divided among industries according to a uniform 
rate of profit allocations. For Samuelson, this procedure is wrong, because the surplus value cannot 
explain the rate of profit. 
The analysis of the various composition of capital is irrelevant for the purpose of explaining the 
prices and profits, “but that, being smart enough to know how to use your eraser, you will succeed in 
coming back to the home port of conventional analysis from which you should never have strayed. […] 
In the meantime, in the spirit of the pathetic challenges that Engels and Marx put forth, show me that I 
am wrong.” (Samuelson 1973)24.  
 Baumol accepted the challenge, but he did not withdraw from his main idea that Marx has to 
be attacked “for the useless detours he actually did take (if indeed they were useless) rather than for the 
detours many writers thought he had taken though in fact he had not.” (Baumol 1973)25. 
It is true that Vol. I uses a complex “machinery” to show the loss of worker in the process 
production, and the fact that the landholder, on the other hand, does not lose anything. However, “our 
Marxist might well ask whether we vulgar economists are not also occasionally guilty of erecting 
                                                        
23 Letter from Baumol to Perlman, April 16th, 1973. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & 
Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 62 
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enormously elaborate superstructures to derive results which are equally obvious, much more banal and 
much less significant socially.” (Baumol 1973).  
The quarrel between Baumol and Samuelson continued in the middle of May, after Baumol 
read Samuelson’s draft of “Marx as a Mathematical Economist”, a paper prepared for the Metzler 
Festschrift to be held in 1974. The paper analyzes the mathematical contributions of Marx: for 
Samuelson, Marx was a pioneer in theorizing the steady state and balanced growth equilibrium, but he 
failed in his theory of value because the surplus values have no role in determining profits. This is a 
clear example of Samuelson’s methodology: “to write about past economic thought, one had to present 
those ideas in modern dress, and to appraise past work, one had to judge it on its merits as good 
economic analysis as we today know it.” (Weintraub 2015; 3). Baumol, in  the other hand, thought that 
Samuelson’s paper was misleading toward Marx’s real purpose. “You interpret me to argue that the 
value analysis somehow gives one a better theory of distribution, or pricing, that somehow it 
“contributes” to our general equilibrium theory. I never intended to imply this. […] In this process you 
have not only misled others, but you have also misled yourself.” (Baumol 1973)26. 
The second cause of disagreement is the contradiction between the model in Volume I and 
Volume III. For Baumol, Volume I is not really necessary to arrive at the conclusions of Volume III, 
because Marx was well aware that he arrived at the same value theory of Smith and Ricardo. Therefore, 
Samuelson is not wrong in the substance of his issue with Marx, because Marx actually did not solve 
the transformation problem, but he is wrong in the conclusion that Marx was not aware of the 
difficulties. Samuelson, on the other hand, still maintained that Volume I was an unnecessary detour 
and that remained Samuelson’s position on what he called the “Number one issue” of the Marxian 
economics debate27. 
“[…] he [Marx] knew long before he wrote Volume I what he was going to say in Volume III. 
If retreat was the issue he had plenty of time to do so without putting his Volume I position into 
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27 Ibidem 
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print.” (Baumol 1973). That is also why Baumol refuted the argument that the analysis of Volume I 
could have been ad “an admitted first approximation” (Baumol 1973) of Volume III28.  
“In sum, my complaint is that you are interspersing your invariably first rate analysis with 
misleading and inaccurate doctrinal history. Marx may be as vulnerable to your attack as you believe, 
but not for views which he never held.” (Baumol 1973)29.  
 “You are a good man” Begins Samuelson in replying to Baumol, thanking him for his accurate 
comments on the Metzler’s paper30. For Samuelson Marx was wrong in thinking that only from prior 
analysis of surplus value could anyone get a proper understanding of actual profit. Moreover, if Marx 
had the solution prior to the publication of Volume I, he would have not delayed the publication for so 
long. For him, Vol. III was a conscious retreat from the model of Vol. I and it was the proof that it was 
indeed a detour, “for the relief of Marx’s opponents like Böhm-Bawerk, and Pareto” (Samuelson 
1973)31.  
 
This brings me to what I regard as an important matter. You sometimes speak of us 
as being general equilibrium economists, and say that what may interest us needn’t be of 
any interest to someone in another paradigm, namely K. Marx. I divorce [myself from] you 
as an equilibrium economist and don’t want to be considered as belonging to your club of 
general equilibrium economists. I want to belong to Marx's club and be interested in one 
thing and that one thing only, namely the distribution of actual-incomes in society and the 
determination of the profit rate, not Walras’s profit rate; not Debreu’s profit rate-- but the 
competitive profit rate. [Samuelson 1973]32. 
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This is exactly the reason of Baumol’s disagreement: Marx was not interested solely in the 
competitive equilibrium. Samuelson, in the process of simplification, did not see that Marx wanted to 
study not only the equilibrium, but also what the formation of profits means for society.  
For Samuelson, Volume I was a detour because Marx could not reconcile the analysis of 
Volume III and the actual reality of the world. Samuelson portraited Marx as an unorganized man, who 
had great ideas, but was poor in translating them into complete works. “So he dithered” (Samuelson 
1973)33. and in doing so, for Samuelson, he was lucky that there was (“poor”) Engels who just used part 
of the Economic and Philosophical manuscripts to complete the missing part of Capital. 
The two problems converged into one: if Volume I was a detour, the reason was that Marx was 
wrong in his analysis, as Samuelson claimed, and he got stuck with the reasoning on surplus value. The 
discussion continued in the middle of June, with a long letter by Baumol dated June 12th, 197334. For 
Baumol: 
 
Marx is making two basic points all tying into the value-transformation-distribution 
discussion: i) that just because values are distributed among wages, profits (interest) and 
rent, it does not mean that values are produced correspondingly, by labor, capital, and land; 
and ii) That Smith is wrong in implying that constant capital can yield surplus value -- it 
merely transmits its own value to the final product. [Baumol 1973]35 
 
To prove his statement, Baumol provided a quotation from Marx criticizing Smith for having 
committed a crucial mistake: not only did Smith not grasp the correct determination of the parts of the 
value commodity, but he proceeded making the revenues the “primary sources of all exchange-value” 
instead of “component parts”, thereby throwing the doors wide open to vulgar economy.” (Baumol 
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1973)36. According to Baumol, there is a deep difference between Marx’s theory and the Classical one, 
which is the true novelty of Marx’s theory:  
 
My contention is, that Marx’ second major objection to Smith is that "Adam Smith 
tries to spirit away the constant portion of the value of commodities." (p.430) […] But why 
is it of such importance to Marx? -- because he is determined to show that waiting or 
abstinence itself creates no value even though it involves delay in the consumption of past 
values themselves created by labor. Capital gets a share of surplus value, but Marx wants no 
one to get away with the notion that capital creates or produces that surplus value. He is 
incensed by the notion that “the capital converted into labor produces a value greater than 
its own (because)...the laborers ... impregnate, during the process of production, the things 
on which they work with a value which forms not only an equivalent for their own 
purchase price, but also a surplus-value ..."(p.432). On the contrary, says Marx, "Nothing is 
altered in the character of the value of a commodity by the function of this value as capital" 
(p.447).” [Baumol 1973]37 
 
Here Baumol is raising two important topics. First, Marx contested that capital and land can 
produce surplus value because, in his theory, the only factor capable of producing surplus value is 
labor. Why then a part of the value produced by workers does not return to them? Because the value 
produced by the workers is higher than the value that they consume. This difference is the surplus-
value. The capitalist is the owner of the means of production, so he can pay the labor force at its value 
and take the surplus value. This is the origin of profit for Marx.  
Second, the problem of the productiveness of capital. This is a crucial point in Marx’s theory: 
for Marx, the productivity is a specific characteristic of labor, and of labor only. The capital per se is 
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not productive, in the sense that it cannot generate a surplus-value. Therefore, capital is not a 
productive factor. Marx took the idea of productive labor from Smith, but he modified Smith’s 
definition: productive labor is the labor that produces surplus-value. Only this definition is coherent 
with capitalist society, since the specific product of the capitalist system is surplus-value. Marx discards 
the other definition proposed by Smith, i.e. that the productive labor is the one that produces material 
objects. Capital is productive in a real sense and not only as a surface manifestation. This assertion is 
not in contrast with the proposition that only labor can produce value. The productive force belongs to 
labor in every historical circumstance. However, in the capitalistic system, the productive force of labor 
is transferred to the capital. Without this transfer, the capital in the capitalistic system could not 
produce anything and, in fact, it could not even exist. So the capital is productive, but this productivity 
is derived from labor, that is always transferred to it and annihilated in it. Therefore, the fact that capital 
is productive is a real fact and not just a surface manifestation. Since capital is productive, there are 
difficulties in linking values to labor quantities. In the capitalistic production the value incorporates the 
rate of profit because the phenomenon of value is at the level of capital.  
Despite their different visions of Marx, Samuelson took seriously what Baumol wrote him 
about Marx and Smith. In a letter dated June 15th 1973, he said that he wanted to make “careful 
changes” in his Metzler paper in order to not magnify their divergences38. Samuelson wrote that he 
really wanted to clarify a fundamental issue both for “Marxists and non-Marxists”: the relationship 
between Volume I and Volume III of Capital. For him, the problem of content of those two volumes is 
related to the history of its completion.  
 
He was great at starting things; poor at finishing them. Great at outlining out 
grandiose publishing projects; poor at estimating how long it would take him to finishing 
them. Great at writing out his thoughts or book notes on any subject at book length (and 
being a great man, every last laundry list of him gets published eventually. […] His health 
                                                        
38 Letter from Samuelson to Baumol June 15th, 1973. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & 
Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 62. 
 58 
went bad long before 1883. The lack of splash of Vol I certainly wouldn’t have goaded him 
into instant completion of Vols II&III. None the less, when we see from Engels’ 1883-94 
editing as best he could of Marx MSS how weak was Marx’s evidences and argumentations 
for what—as you assert and I am willing to go along with you in supporting for the sake of 
the present point – was Marx’s principal purpose and contention (namely that profit can 
only be understood by Marx’s novel sj/vj = si/vi) then…we can congratulate him on never 
having finished Capital. That tactic was a stroke of genius or of inadvertant good luck! (By 
the way, Engels’ challenge is absurd: there was no 1830’s crisis of the Ricardian system; 
there was no contradiction in it, for as you remind people, when Ricardo is not assuming 
the labor theory of value he is not assuming it and there is no reason why such cases 
should not disagree with the latter-theory-of-value cases. [Samuelson 1973]39.  
 
Both in this letter and in the letter of May 25th 1973, Samuelson is using historical facts to prove 
that Marx basically reached an impasse in his economic analysis, a deviation from his usual 
methodology. The result is a merciless portrait of Marx.  
Three days after this letter, came a curious letter from Baumol40. The letter explains how 
Baumol came to his idea that Marx never wanted to transform values into prices and it can be 
considered the revelation of the true origin of all this debate. The anecdote could have been hilarious if 
Baumol did not write it with a serious tone.  
 
I have decided to confess to you the advantage under which I am carrying out my 
side of the argument. The point is that I have evidence that Marx has chosen to have 
another try at getting his message across and has chosen me as he medium for his purpose. 
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If this suggests to you that Baumol has gone completely off his rocker, let me recount he 
tale and tell me whether you’re unwilling to reject the null hypothesis. [Baumol 1973]41 
 
When Baumol finished writing the first draft of the paper, his secretary found some books in a 
trash can and took some of them home. Among them there was a book on Marx that contained some 
letters that Baumol have never seen before. One of the letters contained what for Baumol was the 
explanation of this dilemma, i.e. that Marx was setting traps for the vulgar burgeois economists. It is 
difficult to know how much Baumol believed in this story, or just reported it for fun. He was aware of 
the eccentricity of this revelation, but nevertheless he seemed to believe that this had some sort of 
meaning. This is evident from the first line, where he stated that he wanted to confess the “advantage”, 
as he was chosen by Marx to clarify his thought. Unfortunately, there is no Samuelson’s direct reaction 
to this confession, but he mentioned Baumol’s revelation in the final version of his paper, responding 
with another “serendipity” finding.  
The correspondence between Samuelson and Baumol started in March and as of June there is 
no mention of an official reply (in the form of a paper) to Baumol by Samuelson. There is a letter to 
Samuelson from Perlman dated August 21st, 1973 where Perlman refereed to a reply to Baumol by 
Samuelson. This means that a reply intended for publication was in the making, driven by the letters 
exchanged in more than four months. 
Overall, this first round of debate ended in a stalemate. Baumol and Samuelson did not 
mention their different view of history of ideas, but it was like they were speaking different languages. 
As Weintraub wrote: “Samuelson was not doing Whig history. Samuelson was performing economic 
analysis” (Weintraub 2015; 7). Baumol, on the other hand, was doing history before economic analysis, 
i.e.  that he was searching what Marx thought before judging what Marx accomplished. It is interesting 
to note that the two visions of Marx are not completely incompatible, as Baumol realized later.  
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2.2 Samuelson and Morishima on Marx’s Mathematics 
During May 1973, Baumol received a letter by Morishima Michio, professor of Economics at 
the London School of Economics, who read the draft of Baumol’s paper on Marx. Morishima did not 
explain how he got the draft of the paper. He stated that he liked the paper and that their views were 
“very close” (Morishima 1973) 42. Baumol’s paper renewed his interest for the transformation problem, 
so he started to work again on it with a “purely mathematical work” (Morishima 1973)43. The entrance 
of Morishima is this discussion is again not casual. His book Marx’s Economics: A Dual Theory of Value 
and Growth just appeared in 1973. In fact, Baumol read Morishima’s book and used it as a reference for 
his “What Marx Really Meant” paper. Morishima’s debate was not with Baumol, but with Samuelson.  
The first letter between them on this topic is dated June 22nd, 1973: it was a small message from 
Morishima to Samuelson to thank him for the comments on his book and to tell him that he was 
working on a paper on the transformation problem. The paper would be centered on an “iteration 
process proposed by Marx” (Morishima 1973) and that the paper will be a further generalization of 
Samuelson’s equal internal composition of capital44.  
Samuelson replied to Morishima in an undated letter, but it is reasonable to presume that was 
sent between the end of June and the beginning of July45. In his opinion, there were no substantive 
differences between their visions of the problem and he explained why he decided to join the debate on 
Marx: 
 
The debate among American and English Marxists of my adult years has been over 
this issue: "What, if any, is the advantage in a system capable of surplus, of departing from 
equal-positive-profit rates to a novel model involving equal-positive-surplus-value rates? 
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There has been no serious debate on the proposition that “competitive price ratios 
deviate from (a) embodied labor contents and from (b) values (the magnitudes in (a) 
marked up by equal positive rates of surplus-value).  
Before and after 1957 I have been concerned to give an objective answer to this 
question. In my JEL 1971 paper (and, again, in a forthcoming reply to Lerner who accuses 
me of being ‘soft’ on Marx), I make clear that the Vol.I approximations are a bit easier to 
handle for people poor at algebra. […] but I doubt that any mathematician who came to 
the subject fresh, never having heard of either Marx or Walras, would agree that this is a 
natural way of approaching these theorems. [Samuelson 1973]46 
 
Samuelson was responding to what he considered a missing in the debate about Marx. While 
the debate focused mainly on the possibility of shifting from a system with surplus, not with equal 
positive profit rates but with positive surplus-values rates. This is nonsense in Samuelson’s mind: he 
wanted to research how competitive price ratios deviate from the embodied labor contents and from 
values. That was the reason behind his 1970 and 1971 papers.  
Morishima sent him a quite algebraically detailed letter to Samuelson in the mid of July. The 
central paragraphs contain the core of Morishima’s approach to this issue:  
 
2. The ultimate purpose of Das Kapital seems to show the productiveness of 
the capitalist system; that is to say, the positiveness of the von Neumann balanced growth 
rate. […] At that time, you remember that Frobenious, Perron and Markov had either not 
been born or were merely babies so that Marx couldn’t use their theorems and therefore he 
had to find his own way. For this purpose he used labour value (as a purely technical 
accounting unit) and developed the theory of exploitation (explaining the social 
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relationship between capitalists and workers). […] It is a pity that such excellent social 
science devices have been replaced by abstract mathematical theorems. […] 
4. There are at least 3 transformation problems: one between p* and e*, the 
second between prices and values, and the third between the rate of accumulation in the 
reproduction system in terms of value and capitalists’ propensity to save. Marx was never 
concerned with the last and very such emphasised the importance of the first, while 
followers and critics have been concerned mainly with the second. [Morishima 1973]47 
 
Morishima’s argument show how Baumol’s and Samuelson’s divergence is not necessarily a 
matter of tools, but a matter of different visions of economic thought. He used modern mathematics to 
analyze Marx’s theories, but he also put Marx’s theories in the right historical context. The fact that 
Marx was not able to carry out his analysis fully due to insufficient mathematical instruments available 
at his time is reprised and fully articulated in another paper by Morishima, “Marx in the Light of 
Modern Economic Theory” published in Econometrica in July 1974, the paper that Morishima 
announced in the letters to Baumol and Samuelson.  
For Morishima, there are two types of mathematical economists: one which applies existing 
mathematics to economic problems (like Cournot) and the other who anticipates new mathematical 
problems within economics. Marx belongs to the second type and he was able to anticipate, any 
problems that require advanced mathematics and that is why Marx did not solve them. The source of 
discrepancies between Samuelson and Baumol is that the former saw in Marx’s writings the imperfect 
continuation of ideas that other developed, while the latter considered revolutionary Marx’s use of 
those ideas.  
The correspondence between them ended in October. Morishima wrote an official reply to 
Samuelson in September 1973 and Perlman delayed the deadline in order to also include Morishima’s 
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contribution. Morishima then wrote a “Rejoinder” to be included in the JEL colloquium, but he 
withdrew it before publication48.  
 
As the deadline approached, it was time to close the papers. Baumol sent to Morishima his 
official reply to Samuelson in October, and Morishima found it in line with his own reply49. The last 
letter between them is dated November 7th, 1973, where Baumol seemed satisfied with both their 
contributions, as they clarify the substance of their quarrel with Samuelson. 
Samuelson sent the final version of his reply to Baumol to Perlman, Baumol and Morishima on 
November 19th, 1973. The letter also contained the draft of another reply to be included in the same 
issue. He was not satisfied with both Baumol’s and Morishima’s replies and he wanted to have the last 
word as he did in the 1971 discussion.  
On November 27th, Morishima sent a letter to Perlman containing a “Rejoinder” to be 
published after Samuelson’s final comment. However, this rejoinder does not appear in the issue. The 
reason must be that Morishima read the final version of Samuelson’s reply and decided that their 
divergences were somehow settled50: “I am happy with Samuelson’s elections so there is now no reason 
to publish my one-page rejoinder.” (Morishima 1973)51.  
This marks the end of the first part of the discussion. Like a rock tossed in the water, Baumol’s 
paper generated waves of debates that expanded well beyond the initial quarrel with Samuelson. As we 
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3. The Final Colloquium 
In the Editor’s note to “On Marx, the Transformation Problem and Opacity”, Perlman wrote 
that few articles generated a debate like Samuelson’s 1971 did, but Baumol found a new history of the 
same subject that deserved attention. Here is the debate that this new discovery generated. “In the 
course of Samuelson’s reply, he “took on” Professor Morishima, who quite naturally wanted to add a 
few words of further explanation. […] We have finally allowed Professors Baumol and Samuelson to 
share in what we hope are the “last words.” (Perlman 1974; 51). 
The colloquium opens with Baumol’s paper, “The Transformation of Values: What Marx Really 
Meant (An Interpretation)”. The argument is the one seen before, i.e. that Marx’s real intention was to 
derive non-wage incomes from values and not to derive competitive prices from values.  
For Baumol, Marx described the formation of surplus values in Volume I and explained its 
distribution among non-wage incomes in Volume III. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the 
two volumes. The fact that many economists considered Volume I a detour “is merely a reflection of 
our own prejudices as bourgeois (shall I say, ‘vulgar’?) economists.” (Baumol 1973, 24). Moreover, 
prices being a superficial manifestation of the bourgeois economy (Baumol 1974; 54) Marx was not 
really interested in them. It was more important to explain the process of “extraction of surplus value 
in various sectors of the economy.” (Baumol 1974; 54). The value theory was meant to explain the 
contribution of every activity to the formation of surplus values and Marx’ confrontation with price 
formation served only to reveal to the eyes of bourgeois economists the truth of the profit formation, 
beyond its surface manifestation. The phenomenon of pricing must be explained to take it out of the 
scene in order to highlight what is really important. The real purpose of the transformation problem 
was then to show that labor is the true source of value and that the competitive process “is merely a 
distributive phenomenon and conceals the fact that labor is the only socially relevant source of output. 
This is the significance of the value theory and the transformation analysis to Marx.” (Baumol 1974; 
59). 
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In the final form of his reply, “Insight and Detour in the Theory of Exploitation: A Reply to 
Baumol”, Samuelson judgement on Baumol’s work is quite harsh: “Baumol believes in homeopathic 
remedies.” (Samuelson 1974; 63). Samuelson reprised his argument that the surplus values is not the 
source of any profit and that neither Marx or Morishima gave reason to believe that it is possible to 
determine profits if someone know the surplus value. Whatever the intention of Marx was, he did not 
succeed in demonstrating anything and that Volume I is an useless detour from the price theory of 
Volume III. There is then the return of the eraser to replace the useless detour of the surplus value and 
replace it with the equations of equalized profit behavior. Second, Marx’s theory of the capitalist 
economy is harmed rather helped by the surplus-value theory.  
 “I am enormously puzzled by Professor Samuelson's reply. It is, of course, the brilliant sort of 
comment one expects of him-but it seems to be a reply to an article which I never wrote.” (Baumol 
1974; 74). This is the incipit of Baumol’s reply to Samuelson, “The Fundamental Marxian Theorem: A 
Reply to Samuelson: Comment”. The various critiques that Baumol made in his reply to Samuelson can 
be summed up in two major points. The first one is that he never wanted to discuss Marx’s arithmetic, 
or to determine if Marx was right or wrong in his calculations (and he repeatedly said that Marx was 
wrong). His purpose was before the algebra: he simply wanted to demonstrate what Marx’s real 
intentions were, whether he succeeded or not in achieve them. The second one is that he can concede, 
and in fact he did in the letters, that Marx did take a detour in Capital’s Volume I, but that was because 
Marx knew that prices, wages and rent were already explicable with the Classical mechanism. Baumol 
stated that in order to end the disagreement between them, Samuelson had to admit that Marx himself 
was not interested in those magnitudes per se, but because they were the key to discover underlying 
social production relationships.  
In his “The Fundamental Marxian Theorem: A Reply to Samuelson”, Morishima arrived at a 
result that is way more intriguing that the “eraser” of Samuelson. “I finally decide to discard the value 
theory, but I find, at the end of the book, that the concept of "exploitation" may survive. This 
conclusion has stronger effects than Samuelson's "erase and replace" conclusion; it should be a serious 
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attack on Marx.” (Morishima 1974; 73). This confutes at least one of Samuleson’s claims, i.e. the 
irrelevance of surplus values for the exploitation. Morishima’s conclusion is that the long-run 
equilibrium rate of profit R* is positive if and only if the rate of exploitation is positive and this is a 
finding completely independent from the concept of value. The point of contact with Baumol’s 
argument is that, for Morishima, “Marx’s theory of value should not be considered as a primitive or 
obsolete price theory. There is no point in comparing translation of the price accounting in the value 
accounting or vice versa […]” (Morishima 1974; 71, note 3).  
The last paper in order of publication is the final reply by Samuelson, “Rejoinder: Merlin 
Unclothed, A Final Word”. The title is evocative: it is a combination of Merlin, the wizard who reveals 
the secrets of what lies beneath the surface, and the child in Hans Christian Andersen’s tale of the 
Emperor's Clothes. It takes the expertise of a wizard to see beyond the surface, but the ingenuity of a 
child to see the truth.  
The truth that Samuelson wanted to show is that what Marx actually wanted to do was wrong in 
an algebraic and economic sense. Samuelson mirrored, or mocked, Baumol’s incidental finding of 
Marx’s letter in a trash can by reporting that he also came by chance to find an interesting contribution 
by Veblen in a book by Dorfman about the “Number One Problem” (Samuelson 1974;76), i.e. the 
transformation problem. The core of the quotation is that Veblen stated that “The rate of surplus-value 
bears no tangible relation to the rate of profits. The two vary quite independently of one another. Nor 
does the aggregate profits in any concrete case, in any given industry or enterprise, depend on or 
coincide in magnitude with the aggregate surplus-value produced in that industry or enterprise. For all 
useful purposes the entire surplus-value theory is virtually avowed to be meaningless lumber” 
(Dorfman 1973: 263-264, quoted in Samuelson 1974, 77). If Samuelson’s serendipity finding revealed 
that the transformation problem just does not hold, what is the truth then? “But, alas, apparently the 
challenge must still stand.” (Samuelson 1974;76). 
  
 67 
4. Not the Final Words 
The challenge remained. In Perlman’s correspondence there is a letter sent to Bronfenbrenner 
on May 1974 where he stated that “the Marxian world is fracturing more, rather than less. Morishima 
considers himself to be no Marxian (this is in marked contrast to Baumol, who, I am told, now refers to 
himself as a Marxist). Without a score card it is almost impossible to keep the players straight.” 
(Perlman 1974)52. Those were not the final words, despite Perlman’s hopes.  
 
4.1 Baumol and Dorfman on Wages and Subsistence 
Baumol’s correspondence on his paper reprised in June 1974, this time with Robert Dorfman. 
Dorfman was also not new to Marxian problems, notably thanks to his book, Linear Programming and 
Economic Analysis (1958) written with Samuelson and Solow. He showed less rigidity in his vision of 
Marx, but nevertheless he shared Samuelson’s methodology: the problem should be simplified and 
modelled in order to analyze what were the important issues for the economist.  
Dorfman was very dissatisfied with the debate on the JEL and he wrote a letter to Baumol with 
a series of critiques53. He began his letter with a sharp statement about the debate:  
 
Your exchange with Samuelson et al. in the JEL (about Marxist economics) rather 
distressed me because you fellows seemed to be misunderstanding each other 
unaccountably (and maybe even perversely) and thereby spreading a virulently contagious 
confusion among your readers. As far as I can see, the argument is not semantic and 
mushy, but substantive and decidable, and none of the participants has misinterpreted 
Marx, as you seem to feel. [Dorfman 1974]54 
. 
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In a capitalist economy, he explained, the total of surplus value is equivalent to the total amount 
of capitalist profits, or non-wage incomes. Samuelson was aware of this and he engaged in the 
transformation problem to demonstrate this theorem. Dorfman highlighted that he used the word 
“equivalent to” rather than “equal to” because there is a problem of unit of measure between surplus 
values and profits: the former is measured in labor time (hours), while the latter is measured in dollars. 
He proposed to measure profits in wage-units, so the scaling problem is solved and the theorem can be 
stated as follows: total amount of surplus value generated in an economy is equal to the total amount of 
capitalists’ profits. (Dorfman 1974)55.  
Dorfman started to illustrate the algebra to demonstrate the theorem56. He found two equations 
that depend on R, the rate of profit: 1) Rao[I – (1+R)a]-1(I - a)-1y = (1-vo)ao(I-a)-1y and 2) (1+R)ao[I – 
(1+R)a]-1 m = 1.  
The first equation equals the total amount of surplus to the money value of gross output, while 
the second one equals the total of the labor time expressed in wage bills and the total subsistence cost 
of the labor force. The second equation is given by assuming that the value of R is determined in the 
marketplace, so that all the prices are determined, together with the money-cost of the subsistence 
vector. Dorfman noted that the second one is the equation that worries Samuelson: if workers are paid 
the money equivalence of their labor time, the two equations will not have the same value of R, so the 
total profits will not be equal to surplus value. So, if workers are paid the monetary equivalent of the 
value of their labor time, the total surplus value will not be equal to total profits, “and the Marxist 
theorem is false” (Dorfman 1974). The two magnitudes can be equal only by coincidence.  
 
The difficulty is caused by the fact that the workers buy their wage-goods for 
money prices which are the results of the transformation of Marxist values into monetary 
                                                        
55 Letter from Dorfman to Baumol, June, 7th, 1974. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & 
Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 62. 
56 The notation is Samuelson’s: a is the input-output matrix, ao is the vector of direct labor requirements per unit of output, 
m is the vector of the subsistence bundle for laborers, and y any vector final products including consumption goods for the 
workers and luxury goods for the capitalist. The total amount of value generated (= socially necessary labor time) is ao(I - 
a)-1y. The value of a unit of labor time is vo = ao (I - a)-1m. The row vector of profits per unit is p - pa - ao 
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values. As far as I can perceive, this is what makes it impossible to simultaneously (1) pay 
workers a subsistence wage, or the monetary equivalent of the Marxist value of labor time, 
and (2) maintain the equality between profits and the monetary equivalent of surplus value. 
[Dorfman 1974]57 
 
Baumol replied on July 3rd, 1974.58 He was puzzled by Dorfman’s letter and he did not agree 
with the irrelevance of the textual level of analysis. For him, Samuelson’s and Dorfman’s concerns 
relate to the consistency of the price theory derived from Marx’s analysis.  Marx said first that the 
money value of total output must equal its labor value and, second, that total surplus value must equal 
total profit. Other writers, in particular Mark Blaug, have argued that those two are incompatible, while 
Samuelson has shown that even the equivalence between surplus values and profits can cause problems 
with the requirement that workers receive only enough to purchase their subsistence wages.  
The problem with this reasoning is that “it really does put Marx in the position of "a minor post 
Ricardian" who simply was doing a mediocre job of getting at price theory.” (Baumol 1974)59, while 
Marx’s intentions were well beyond the simple formulation of a price theory60,  “whether Marx was a 
good or a poor economist, this is a complete misinterpretation of his purposes as he described them 
again and again.” (Baumol 1974)61.  
Baumol explained that the primary scope of the value theory is to show that the surplus value 
originates from labor and only from labor. Which portion of the surplus value goes to the workers and 
which goes to the capitalists is decided by the class struggle and this is precisely the “underlying reality” 
that Marx wanted to reveal. The link with the transformation problem is that the latter was meant to 
show how the surface manifestations (i.e. prices and profits) distort the true reality of exploitation. 
                                                        
57 Letter from Dorfman to Baumol, June, 7th, 1974. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & 
Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 62. 
58 Letter from Baumol to Dorfman July, 3rd, 1974. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & 
Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 62. 
59 Ibidem 
60 Samuelson defined Marx a “minor post-Ricardian” in the paper “Wages and Interest: A Modern Dissection of Marxian 
Economic Models” published on The American Economic Review in 1957. 
61 Letter from Baumol to Dorfman July, 3rd, 1974. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & 
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Baumol admitted that Marx did a “bad attempt”, he did fail in his transformation calculation. That was 
evident well before Samuelson, but this is not in contradiction with Marx’s true intentions:   
 
In sum, my position is that there are two important issues: Marx’s purpose, which is 
misunderstood, and the consistency with which he carried out his calculations. Paul 
addresses himself to the latter and I to the former, and there is no reason why either 
enterprise must detract from the importance or the validity of the other. It is Paul's failure 
to see this, and not the logic of his argument about Marx, that still leaves me utterly 
puzzled. [Baumol 1974]62 
 
The discussion could have ended here, but instead it continued for the first half of 1975. The 
second part of the discussion doesn’t add much to the story. It was mostly about the meaning of 
Dorfman’s equations in the light of Marxian theory. However, there is a specific statement by Baumol 
that is important to report. It is contained in the last documented letter between them, dated August 
15th, 197563. Baumol agreed that Marx did equate total profit to total surplus, but he said that they 
already agreed that was just a matter of selecting the right monetary unit, “an inessential choice of 
constant”.  
 
The issue isn’t whether he carried out the transformation correctly (he certainly did 
not) but whether there is no way to carry it out consistently. Specifically, is it inconsistent 
to have a model in which total product is divided between workers and capitalists as Marx 
says in volume I, and then prices are determined so that the capitalists share is divided 
among capitalists in a way that gives all investors the same rate of return? My suspicion is 
that the insights provided by this way of looking at the matter are far less than Marx 
                                                        
62 Letter from Baumol to Dorfman July, 3rd, 1974. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & 
Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 62. 
63 Letter from Baumol to Dorfman, August 15st, 1975. William J. Baumol Papers, David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & 
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claimed, but that there is no necessary contradiction in the story. However, that is still only 
a suspicion. [Baumol 1975]64 
 
Baumol’s paper aimed only at clarifying those intentions, whatever comes next is still matter for 
inquiry. What is important is to address the problem in the right way and Dorfman’s (and Samuelson’s 
before him) in Baumol’s opinion is not the right way. A collateral effect of Baumol’s correspondence 
with Dorfman is that is ignited again the debate with Samuelson.  
 
4.2 Baumol and Samuelson: Reprise  
During the first stages of the debate between Baumol and Dorfman, Dorfman sent Baumol’s 
reply to Samuelson, probably in search for advice. Samuelson’s reply arrived quickly:  
“I am always in need of instruction, and since Will’s position is puzzling to me (and to everyone 
I’ve discussed it with), I can only benefit from every reformulation and expansion of it.” (Samuelson 
1974)65. Samuelson could not understand why Baumol did not, or refused to, recognize Marx’s failure. 
Baumol’s interpretation of Marx sounded so strange to Samuelson that he referred to it with the name 
of “Baumolism”66: “It is important to understand what an author thought he was doing and proving, 
without regard to the cogency of his efforts. Many people have not identified correctly what Marx really 
thought he was doing. I, Baumol, perceive just what Marx's purpose was and provide the following 
quotations to back up my contention.” (Samuelson 1974)67. Then follows a long sum of Samuelson’s 
vision of Baumol’s position: Marx thought that in order to understand the total profit share can be best 
understood by the analysis of surplus values. This “novel Vol I analysis” would enable Marx to explain 
the total surplus value at a macroeconomic level, but Volume III would show that this total of surplus, 
“which can only be understood by the transcendental analytical innovations of a more-than-minor-post 
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Ricardian, would establish that the total of profits in the actual capitalist world is precisely this now-
understood total of surpluses” (Samuelson 1974)68. If this is true, then the problem becomes how this 
surplus gets parceled in the different industries. For Samuelson this is simply wrong and “only through 
my parable of equated totals can one really understand capitalism, its laws of motion, and its workings”. 
(Samuelson 1974)69. 
Baumol should have admitted that Marx just committed logical errors in thinking that the total 
of surplus values is equal to the total pf profits, and even in the single case pointed out by Samuelson, 
the whole issue can be solved with the tools of equal profit rates by industries already developed by the 
Classical economists before Marx. For Samuelson Marx should be judged by what he did accomplish. 
Whatever his purpose was, Marx failed.  
Samuelson wrote again to Baumol after some months because he was requested to translate his 
JEL paper on Marx, and he had also to provide a brief summary of the discussion. Since their positions 
continued to diverge, he tried to fix some points to be reported in the summary.  
Samuelson noted that, in the letter to Dorfman, Baumol clearly stated that he dis not believe 
that the total surplus values equal total profit. This is really important, because it was the core of 
Samuelson’s argument. However, he said that from Baumol’s JEL paper it really seemed that Baumol 
believed in the “false theorem” that the total surplus equals the total of profits. “Do you agree that, 
whatever Marx's intention, the parable misfires?’ My last purpose is to let political opinions about 
Marxism interfere with a fair statement (sic) of the analytics of Marx.” (Samuelson 1974)70.  
Baumol was asked to pronounce himself on two points: the validity of the equivalence between 
surplus values and total profits and the fact that Marx did not accomplish his purposes, whatever they 
were. On the first point, he conceded that Samuelson was right and that “this Marxian assertion is 
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simply unacceptable, as is the requirement that the sum of prices is equal to the sum of values, whose 
unacceptability seems more obvious.” (Baumol 1973)71 
However, Baumol knew that in the theory of value there was more than simple pricing. While 
Samuelson was ruling out the possibility that the labor theory of value could have an economic 
meaning, for Baumol this is something that has to be investigated. What Baumol wanted to obtain 
from Samuelson was the agreement on the fact that Marx did not want to construct a theory of prices, 
therefore it was wrong to accuse him of having failed in doing so. It is true, argues Baumol, that it is a 
tautology to say that all goods and services produced by labor but consumed by capitalists or rentiers 
are goods and services not consumed by workers. This is true whether the unit of measure it is used for 
those goods.  
 
 But it seems to me that this tautology which is what much of the value discussion 
amounts to and not the alleged equality of surplus value and total profit, is the heart of the 
Marxian parable. […]   
The part that is important to Marx, on this view, is not wrong but is pure tautology. 
Why is it important? […] For one, it was important to Marx because it enabled him to 
ascribe profits to exploitation. It was important to him because it served as a basis for his 
(fallacious) model of the declining rate of profit and its implications for the future of 
capitalism. Finally, it may be conjectured that it was most important to Marx as a step in his 
historical model of capitalist development in which the capitalist’s accumulation of labor’s 
surplus product reenters the economic process in the form of increasingly valuable capital 
goods without which labor power cannot be used, and on which labor becomes 
increasingly dependent. It is this historical process that I think Marx had in mind in his 
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discussion of alienation rather than the sentimental slosh that some of his self-appointed 
followers often attribute to him. [Baumol 1974]72 
 
The progressive dependence of labor from capital goods, that on the contrary do not need 
labor, will lead to the progressive increase of exploitation and alienation. In the post scriptum, Baumol 
took the occasion to remark that political opinions do not have any role in his understanding of Marx. 
On the contrary, he thought that he and Samuelson shared quite similar political view. He did not state 
that their divergence can be explained in their different approach to the history of economic thought.  
 
 
In the End, What Did Marx Really Meant? 
There is evidence that Baumol did not reject his interpretation of Marx. For example, in his 
lectures in the History of Economic Thought at Princeton, dated 1977 and 1978, he reported clearly his 
thesis about the relationship between values and prices in Marx, using even the same words of the 
paper in some passages (along with the copies of Dorfman’s letters). There is also a long note on Marx 
dated 1975 where Baumol summed up all the history and economic theory behind the transformation 
problem and he used the same arguments and sources cited in the papers. Baumol returned also on the 
problem of the interpretation of Marx’ theories: in “The Folklore of Marxism” (1979) he debunked the 
common approach to the “iron law of wages”, showing that this interpretation was not what Marx 
intended. In fact Baumol never stopped writing about history of ideas, despite his statements on the 
history of economic thought. There is also an unpublished paper named “Dr. Marx, Dr. Frankenstein 
and Mr. Ricardo” dated 1999 where Baumol returned on the problem of the correct interpretation of 
the value theory in Ricardo and Marx. 
There is also evidence that Baumol and Samuelson kept arguing about history of economic 
thought, albeit always in friendly terms. In 1977 they discussed a paper by Samuelson about Ricardo, 
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but it ended in a quick agreement. In the early 2000s they had a quarrel over an interpretation of David 
Ricardo, that involved also Samuel Hollander, but the main reasons of their disagreement could be 
identified again in their different approach to the history of economic thought.  
Baumol and Samuelson divergence can be explained regarding the different approach to the 
history of economic ideas and their authors. Baumol wanted to correct what he perceived to be a 
mistake in the literature about Marx, a misunderstanding that made Marx appear just a “minor post-
Ricardian”. Baumol wanted to put in context Marx’s ideas. He thought that the Classical authors’ 
writing have ambiguities that economists should try to explain, but there may not be a definitive 
explanation.  
Samuelson’s argument shows that many problems of the Marxian analysis can be solved, at least 
in their quantitative side, without the labor value theory. However, beneath his analysis, there is the 
conviction that the history of economics is additive, so the ideas of the past are to be judged in the light 
of the present conquests of economics. This is coherent with his methodology, i.e. to simplifying the 
problems, take out the unnecessary details and analyzing smaller models.  
Through their quarrel, Baumol and Samuelson took on board other economists who helped to 
define their own views. In the case of Dorfman, his exchange with Baumol helped him to define many 
important concepts that are not clearly expressed in the paper, but also reinforced the “Whig” 
interpretation of history of economics. Morishima is an interesting case of mixed approach. While he 
used the same tools of Samuelson, he never forgot to put Marx in the right historical context. His paper 
and letters show how it is possible to reflect on Marx using modern tools without consider him a 
“minor post-Ricardian”. 
It is worth noting that Baumol’s paper ultimately envisioned a different structure of the 
economy, focused on the surplus produced and the way to distribute it. The capital controversy is 
never explicitly mentioned in the letters, but Baumol’s arguments reminds of the different structure of 
the economy that emerged from that debate. “Robinson argued—citing Veblen (1908) and raising the 
specter of Marx—that the meaning of capital lay in the property owned by the capitalist class, which 
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confers on capitalists the legal right and economic authority to take a share of the surplus created by 
the production process.” (Cohen and Harcourt 2003; 208). Despite being both neoclassical economists, 
Samuelson and Baumol show two different vision of the economy. Samuelson had a plain neoclassical 
vision, where agents maximize the lifetime utility in a world of scarce resources with alternative uses. In 
this light, it is no surprise that Marx was a “minor post-Ricardian”. Baumol understood that Marx’s 
vision of economics was different: he acknowledged the differences of power and social classes in 
explaining the different distribution of surplus. The re-discovery of Marx could be an offspring of this 
fading debate. 
In his first official reply to Baumol, Samuelson wrote: “In the history of thought, we realize that 
detour may serve useful purposes.” (Samuelson 1974; 69). This was indeed the story of a useful detour. 
Useful because it shows two different ways to approach the history of economics and how the 
methodology can affect the conclusions. Another reason is that “If you only know the economic part 
of Marx, there is not much to be saved of his theory.” (Napoleoni 1992, 166)73. What remains to 
explain is the implications of the invalidity of labor theory of value for the economic theory, but this is 
another story.  
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This paper explores Martin Bronfenbrenner’s views of Japanese economic thought after the 
Second World War. He analyzed the evolution of the Japanese economic thought as he personally 
witnessed Japan’s social and economic changes. He also met many Japanese economists, which gave 
him a privileged perspective on the economic thought in Japan. Although with some imprecisions 
derived from cultural differences, his papers are an accurate account of the problems and tensions of 
the Japanese assimilation of Western economics and the reaction of Japanese economists to the 
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1 A Window to the East 
Martin Bronfenbrenner (1914 – 1997) first met Japan just after the end of Second World War, 
in one of the most complex periods of its history. However, he was already a man of two worlds when 
he arrived in Japan during the American occupation in the fall of 1945. He was an American economist 
whose family emigrated from Germany. He graduated at the Washington University in Political Science 
and Economics and he then enrolled in the Graduate School of the University of Chicago. Surrounded 
by economic prodigies74, he discovered many sides of economics, from policy formulation to the 
important realization “that economics was neither ‘cut and dried’ nor ‘all in Marshall’ (or anyone else). 
That it was evolving and developing, especially in the empirical direction. That it was a worthy 
enterprise to join the procession (Henry Schultz and Paul Douglas), even when it leads to alternatives 
for ‘free enterprise’ (Oskar Lange).” (Bronfenbrenner 1988; 4). This statement shows how 
Bronfenbrenner was curious about the development of the discipline and a careful observer. After 
graduation, his employments opportunities were uncertain. In 1941 he decided to volunteer for the 
Pacific Campaign of WWII and enrolled as language officer, with Japanese as the only option still 
available. His experience in the Naval School of Language was terrible, as he recalled it, but it allowed 
him to gain some competence in Japanese. During his first visit in Japan he stationed in Sasebo, in the 
isle of Kyushu (the second largest island of the Japanese archipelago), a quite remote position with 
respect to the central cities like Tokyo or Kyoto. “It could hardly have been more than two weeks that 
I spent in Sasebo. Two weeks was enough for the Japan bug to bite, and I am yet to be completely 
cured.” (Bronfenbrenner 1997; 13-5)75. The bite of the Japan bug is for life: as many people before him, 
he became fascinated by its complex culture and remained linked with Japan for the rest of his life.  
                                                        
74 “My principal traumas at Chicago were not its big guns - not even Professor Viner - but my fellow students. 
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Bronfenbrenner had the right personality to react at the bite of the Japan bug. Eclectic scholar, 
he was one of the general economists who wrote on many different topics: aggregate economics, 
income distribution, international economics, and Japanese economy. He was interested also in 
heterodox theories: his curiosity brought him to study and write on Marx, which resulted in a trial for 
suspected communist affiliation during the McCarthy era. 
After that first encounter, Bronfenbrenner returned to Japan more than 18 times and he even 
attempted to permanently transfer there after his retirement. He saw how Japan changed quickly during 
the economic recovery and how it bloomed again in the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s. He 
also had “a box seat to the economic miracle” (Bronfenbrenner 1988; 6), since he witnessed the rapid 
transformation that Japan undertook from the ruins of the war to the economic development of the 
1960s. The combination of being a spectator of Japan’s economic changes and his encounter with 
Japanese economists with different backgrounds should have made him interested in how economics 
was debated and researched in Japan. During those years, his expertise as economist and interest for 
Japan became known in the academic environment and he started to produce several papers about 
Japanese economics. “I am a self-appointed member of the Lafcadio Hearn chapter of this great 
fraternity, meaning that I feel as nearly at home in Japan as in my native land. But ‘I am not fond of 
everything one sees, that’s Japanese,’ and economic thought has not been Japan’s outstanding 
contribution to world culture.” (Bronfenbrenner 1956; 389)76. He was fascinated by Japanese culture, 
but he was never blinded by his fascination. Bronfenbrenner’s writings about Japan were an important 
source of knowledge about the Japanese economics for Western readers. His main contributions in the 
“economic Japanology”, as he named it, included the analysis of the Japanese economic growth, 
taxation, the Japanese education system and Japanese economic thought. Moreover, he was active in 
promoting the study of Eastern economics and culture: in the Duke Archives there are many letters 
                                                        
76 Lafcadio Hearn (1850 - 1904) was a Greek-Irish writer and journalist, naturalized Japanese. He is known for his 
books about Japanese culture, in particular for his collections of legends and folklore.  
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about scholarships for students from Asia and he worked to expand the program of Japanese studies at 
Duke University.  
The literature on Martin Bronfenbrenner is scarce. His role in the Japanese reconstruction has 
already been explored by Ikeo (2014), who reconstructed the biographical events of his first travels in 
Japan. This paper takes a different approach by reconstructing Bronfenbrenner’s understanding of the 
Japanese economic thought through his three main papers and unpublished materials from the Duke 
University’s Economists’ Papers Archives. His positions are considered in a critical way and analyzed in 
the light of in Japanese history.  
Japanese economic thought was a curious topic for the time, because it was not a subject of 
research for Western scholars. He stated that he became interested in Japanese economic thought at the 
age of 35 and his first paper on the topic was “The State of Japanese Economics” in 1956. After that, 
he wrote a sort of update of his first paper in 1967, “The State of Japanese Economics: Revisited” for a 
Japanese economic journal. The last paper of the trilogy was his presidential speech for the History of 
Economic Society of 1983, a period of considerable debate about Japanese economic strategies and 
when Japan was seen as an economic enemy in the US. Those paper on Japanese economic thought 
were accompanied by papers and book chapters on Japanese economy, like “Four Positions in Japanese 
Finance” (1950) and “Economic Miracle and Japan’s Income-Doubling Plan” (1965), which were a 
consistent part of Bronfenbrenner’s academic writings. Bronfenbrenner kept writing about Japan 
during all his career and his opinions were particularly important in times of great debate about Japan, 
like the Seventies and Eighties. 
Before Bronfenbrenner, the only source for Western to investigate how economics developed 
in Japan scholars were the rare papers written in English by Japanese scholars. Bronfenbrenner’s papers 
on Japanese economic thought provides a significant sum of the history of Japanese economic thought 
and of its evolution from the import of the first Western notions to the development of indigenous 
theories.  
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His analyses were and still are a point of reference in the literature about Japanese economic 
thought: Tessa Morris-Suzuki in her important “History of Japanese Economic Thought” (1989) 
commented on Bronfenbrenner’s treatment of Japanese Marxism, while Mawatari Shohken in 1988 
commented on Bronfenbrenner’s first paper and updated it to Japan’s mutate context. Ikeo Aiko in her 
book Japanese Economics and Economists since 1945 (2000) quoted Bronfenbrenner’s cynical statement of 
economic professors in Japan, who teach something in class and say the opposite outside academia.  
Bronfenbrenner’s strong personality and sense of humor, always present in his letters, speeches 
and papers, were well known in Japan. In fact, he sometimes was addressed by his Japanese colleagues 
with the surname dokusetzuka which means “wicked tongue”, and some scholars referred to him in 
letters as dokusetsuka-sensei, “professor wicked-tongue”. His opinions on Japanese economic thought 
were requested and valued by scholars also because of his sharp personality, very different from the 
typical Japanese quietness, who found in them a new voice in the history of economics environment.  
 
 
2 Economics in Japan: History and Peculiarities 
Japanese economic thought was not an immediate research subject, especially for a Western 
scholar. However, Bronfenbrenner had the right circumstances to be interested in it. He was already 
interested in the history of economic doctrines, as he repeatedly stated in papers and interviews. 
Moreover, he was an eclectic scholar, who studied subjects from various field of economics.  
Japan had its own tradition of economic thinking that dates back to at least the Edo period. It 
was not an independent discipline, but the economic thinking was part of what have been called 
“Science of the State”, a comprehensive reflection on the role of the State derived from Confucian 
tradition. Western economics remained unknown in Japan until it was imported in the second half of 
the 19th Century. It is wrong to consider the Japanese economic thought only as the assimilation of 
Western ideas, but it is  true that the introduction of the Western economics triggered a sort of 
revolution.  
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The introduction of Western culture, and economics, in Japan is deeply linked with the history 
of the country and present some peculiarities that are a unicum in the history of thought, that captured 
Bronfenbrenner’s attention.  
After the unification of the country in the first years of the 1600 by the shogun Tokugawa Ieyasu 
(1543 – 1616) 77, Tokugawa Iemitsu (1604 - 1651) closed the country to the rest of the world, the so 
called sakoku (“closed country”) policy, in 1641. Japan remained then isolated to the rest of the world 
until 1868, the year of the Meiji restoration. However, the isolation was not perfect. Dutch ships were 
allowed to visit the port of Dejima, in the isle of Kyushu, once a year and recent studies emphasize how 
the Western knowledge started to circulate well before 1868, even in a very small portion. In 1853 the 
black ships of the Commodore Perry arrived at the Tokyo Bay. It was the end of Japan isolation and 
the start of a process that will lead to the end of the bakufu (“government under the tent”), the 
government of the Tokugawa family. Japan was not ready to deal with the new Western visitors and the 
discontent for the government started to rise, together with the fear that the visitors would soon 
became conquerors. In 1868 a coalition of samurai guided by the clans of Satsuma (a remote province in 
Kyushu), hostile to the bakufu, guided a revolt against the government: it was the beginning of the Meiji 
Restoration. The authority of the Emperor was restored as the top of the society, with the samurai that 
guided the revolt as the new political oligarchy. When Japan started to open to the rest of the world, it 
became immediately clear how it was behind the West in terms of knowledge and technology. 
Moreover, Japanese statesmen quickly realized what could have been the price for this knowledge gap 
by looking at the fate of India and China and they did everything they could to avoid that same fate. 
Japan then entered in the first period of great and traumatic change of its history: the country faced a 
forced industrialization and knowledge in every field from the West was massively imported. It is in this 
context that Western economics entered in Japan and started to be translated and assimilated. It started 
with secondary literature, mostly commentaries, translated by scholars, and the primary literature 
                                                        
77 In this paper I follow the standard convention of giving Japanese names in Japanese order, with the family name 
followed by the given name.  
Romanization of Japanese terms follows the Hepburn system.  
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started to be imported and translated around 1880s. It is important to notice that the Japanese language 
lacked most of the words to translate the economic concepts from the Western languages. The 
Japanese intellectuals had to invent a whole new set of words to convey economic concepts that were 
alien to Japanese society. The introduction of Western economic thought was not then a simple matter 
of translation and teaching, it was the discovering of a new discipline and the creation of a whole new 
lexicon for it.  
Bronfenbrenner was well aware of this “derivative” character of the Japanese economic 
thought, i.e. that the Japanese studies on economics were based on the imported Western theories and 
schools. However, he thought that this state of things could be temporary: once that the transmission 
of ideas from the West was settled and economists sufficiently trained, Japan could start to produce its 
own economic literature. The essential condition for Japanese economics to be recognized 
internationally is to produce economic literature in some widespread European languages, such as 
English, French or German (Bronfenbrenner 1956). However, the process of assimilation of Western 
economic thought was not simple. Bronfenbrenner recognized that Japan presented some peculiarities 
that make it different from other countries where there has been an import of ideas from the West. The 
peculiarities of Japan were efficiently illustrated by Bronfenbrenner in the speech for the 1983 meeting 
of the History of Economics Society. The core of the presidential speech aimed to address the 
differences between the development of economic studies in Japan and in the other developing 
countries, showing that Japan presents three characteristics peculiar to its own case.  
First, Japan was not tied to a single mother country, so no country had a distinctive influence 
on it. Japan had commercial ties with Netherlands and Portugal, but after the policy of isolation, the 
privileged ties were almost all cut. This means that, in importing economic knowledge, Japan did not 
privilege a specific country or school. It is important to note that this was the initial tendency, because 
as economic literature started to translated and assimilated, Japanese scholars started to have their own 
preferences. For example, the German Historical School had a huge influence in Japan, because of the 
economic and political similarities between the two countries at the end of the 19th Century, since both 
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countries had governments that actively promoted industrial expansion. Marxism, on the other hand, 
was as a reaction to the deep changes of the society from the Meiji Era (1868-1912).  
Second, Bronfenbrenner recognized how the Meiji Statesmen, the oligarchy that took power 
after the fall of the shogunate wanted to avoid the fate of India and China. In order to avoid the destiny 
of a colony, Japan was forced into industrialization and the various ways and problems derived by this 
forced step were economists’ concern. The rapid industrialization of the Meiji and Taisho (1912-1926) 
Eras was a traumatic process. It caused a profound cultural shock on Japanese people, who perceived 
the old values disrupted by the logic of profit. Many intellectuals struggled to understand the new era 
that was developing under their eyes: the economic thought was an essential key to understand the new 
Japan.  
Third, Japan quickly specialized in export commodities which provided foreign exchange to 
send students abroad, hire foreign teachers and at the same time modernize both military and industrial 
facilities. Bronfenbrenner was the first one who explicitly linked those two aspects. This process 
actually started well before the 1950s. In the Meiji Era there were already many scholars of various 
disciplines sent abroad to study. This practice provided a channel to introduce new economic theories 
and to boost the development of indigenous ones.  
Overall, Japan presented some peculiarities with respect other Eastern countries that shaped the 
development of the economic thought. Bronfenbrenner was one of the first Western economists to 
openly point out those peculiarities and to relate them to the Japanese economic thought in order to 
understand its developments.  
 
 
3 The Duality of Japanese Economic Thought: Marxists vs Modernists 
The most iconic sentence of Bronfenbrenner’s first paper on Japanese economic thought is that 
“Japanese economic thought is as advanced as any in the Orient - perhaps even more so. Yet is seems 
to suffer from three besetting ailments: sectarianism, inbreeding, and schizophrenia.” (Bronfenbrenner 
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1956; 390). This statement became relatively famous among the scholars of the history of Japanese 
economic thought and for many years it was the reference point for Western scholars of economic 
thought, whether they agreed or not. 
The sectarianism refers to the division of Japanese economists in approximately two factions: 
the Marxist tradition and the so called “modern economics” (kindai keizaigaku) (Morris-Suzuki 1989). 
Despite an economic discourse different from Marxism already existed in Japan well before the 
American occupation, it was after the Second World War that the contraposition between the two 
factions became well-defined. Even the name of the field “economics” changed between the factions:  
 
Professor Nakajima has pointed out in correspondence how ridiculously un-
scientific it seems, to Japanese scholars outside of the social sciences, for separate and rival 
learned societies to operate in general economic analysis -- with the name Keizai-Riron or 
economic theory appropriated by the Marxian group and the name Riron-Keizaigaku or 
theoretical economics reserved for the modern economists. The situation looks like 
theological sectarianism. [Bronfenbrenner 1967; 8]. 
 
The differences between Marxist and non-Marxist economists shaped the Japanese economic 
discourse for more than four decades.   
 
3.1 The Marxist Tradition 
The introduction of Marxism in Japan dates back to 1900, but the peak of its diffusion was 
between the two World Wars and the immediate post World War II. The reason is that many 
economists and intellectuals saw in the Marxian writings a response to the social and economic crisis of 
the Taisho period. The forced industrialization of the Meiji period caused social problems that Japan 
never experienced before in that form. The capitalist development was unequal, causing a distorted 
distribution of wealth. Many people were forced to move to big cities like Tokyo, disrupting the 
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traditional family bonds. Moreover, an agrarian crisis marked the early Taisho period, with the rice 
production that could not keep the pace of the increasing in population. The 1920s were difficult years 
for the entire Japanese economy and were seen as a “deadlock” in Japan’s development (Hoston 1986; 
10). 
Before the Second World War, the central problem for the Marxist economists was the so-
called debate on capitalism, i.e. to put Japan in the correct stage of economic development. Marx 
theorized the passage to socialism after a long period of capitalism. This posed a serious question for 
Japanese Marxists: should they wait for the capitalist society to be fully developed, or they should act 
whatever the status of the development of capitalism is? (Morris-Suzuki 1989; 81). Apart from the 
theoretical issues, this controversy was also an attempt to adapt Marxism to the Japanese context. It 
caused also a reflection on many aspects of the Japanese reality, like the emperor system (tennosei), the 
Constitution of 1889 and the voting system. The debate on capitalism caused the division of Marxist 
economists into two schools: the Kōza-ha (lecture school) and the Rōnō -ha (labor-farmer school). 
The Kōza-ha derived its name from the multivolume collection of Lectures on the Historical 
Development of Japanese Capitalism (Nihon Shihonshugi Hattatsu Shi Kōza, 1932–3) and its interpretation 
was that Japan was not a fully developed capitalistic society, because the semi-feudal links between 
landlords and peasants did not disappear, but were incorporated into the capitalist economic system. 
The reason was that Japanese industrial entrepreneurs did not emerge as an independent political force, 
but they remained dependent on the support of the imperial bureaucracy.  
The Rōnō-ha was named after the Journal Worker and Farmer (Rōnō) and the members of this 
school were in fact economists and historians who had separated from the Communist Party during the 
years 1924-5. The Rōnō-ha was critical towards the Kōza-ha interpretation of Japanese capitalism, since 
it considered Japan as a full-developed capitalistic society, without remains of its feudal past. Many 
members of the Rōnō-ha did not have many connections with the Journal, but they disliked the rigidity 
and dogmatism that in their view characterized the Kōza-ha school. The importance of determine 
which historical stage corresponded to Japan’s situation lied in the prospects for revolution. According 
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to Marxian economists, if the Kōza-ha were right, revolutionists should form a united front with Left 
liberals as the first stage of the socialist revolution. If the Rōnō-ha were correct, the liberals should be 
treated as enemies, without possibilities of allegiances.  
There were two phases of the Kōza - Rōnō debate (Hoston 1986; 35). The first phase goes 
from 1927 to 1931 and began with the dissidents of the Rōnō-ha leaving the Japanese Communist 
Party, following Yamakawa Hitoshi, former leader of the Party. The departure was triggered by the 
adoption by the Japanese Communist Party of the Comintern’s July 1927 Theses on Japan, which 
highlighted the persistence of feudal aspects in Japanese economy and society ad advocated a  two-
stage revolution. This first period was then characterized by the advocacy of one-stage revolution by 
the Rono-ha dissidents.  
The second phases started in 1932, with the pressures derived from the increasing repression by 
the government. The repression started in the 1920s and increased with the Peace Preservation Law in 
1925, which allowed the police to conduct massive arrests of political dissidents. This forced the debate 
to move underground. The effort by Japanese Marxists to conduct their own analysis resulted in the 
publication of Nihon shihon-shugi hattatsu shi koza and the re-name of the faction loyal to the Comintern 
in Kōza-ha. The emergence of this second faction marked the beginning of a series of theoretical and 
abstract contributions.  
The influence of Marxism between the two wars was stopped by the raising of the military 
regime: starting from 1923 with the purge of several members of the Japanese Communist Party and 
for all the 1930s and 1940s, Marxist, socialist but also liberal intellectuals were arrested or forced to 
retire from the public life. The controversy was then abruptly put to an end, unresolved. The repression 
started with the Kōza-ha affiliates, which had close connections with the Japanese Communist Party, 
but by the end of 1930s it involved also the members of the Rōnō-ha, who always highlighted their 
independence from the Japanese Communist Party. 
After the war, the professors who were purged were restored to their previous positions. They 
were seen under a new light, mostly thanks to their opposition to militarism. At the same time, the 
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leading figures of the right in the war period were removed from their positions and some politicians 
were taken on trial. The situation of deprivation and misery of the post-war period made socialism 
intellectually and politically appealing.  
During the American occupation, many eminent figures of the pre-war Marxist debates retuned 
as prominent figures of the new debates. However, the post-war debates could not simply resume the 
pre-war ones, for the Japanese economy and society was deeply changed. As Bronfenbrenner summed 
up in his 1983 speech, the interwar Marxism was concerned to fix the failure of development that did 
not alleviate Japan’s poverty and to apply the Marxist interpretation of history to the Japanese case.  
The rapid economic growth that started in the late 1950s created new analytical problems for 
the Marxist economists, who were forced to find theories able to explain a country in which increasing 
real incomes were promoting the rapid rise of consumer materialism. Moreover, Marxist economists 
found themselves relatively isolated from the international community, since Marxist economics 
entered in a period of recession in the English-speaking academic world. This had the positive effect 
that their theories developed in a number of distinctive directions.  
 
3.2 Bronfenbrenner’s Analysis of Japanese Marxism 
Bronfenbrenner did not have a high opinion of Japanese Marxists and it is evident from the 
very first lines of his 1956 paper, but with an important caveat:  
 
Since my appraisal of Japanese Marxism in particular is not high, I want to take this 
opportunity to dissociate myself from the near-suppression of Marxian economics in 
America, which contributes rather largely to our unpopularity in Japanese intellectual 
circles. The greater freedom existing in Japanese universities in this respect seems to me 
almost completely laudable although occasionally abused. [Bronfenbrenner 1956; 390].  
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The fact that he did not have a high opinion of Japanese Marxists did not mean that he was 
against the study of Marx. The presence of a different vision within the universities was a positive sign, 
even with the shortcomings that he listed below.  
Marxism in Japan was still widespread even after the end of the American occupation. As 
Bronfenbrenner explained, the presence of Marxists economists seemed higher because there was a 
certain reticence toward openly anti-Marxists statements, since it reminded to the purges of the fascist 
period. Marxists economists were described by Bronfenbrenner as illiterate about everything concerned 
with modern economics, because of their ideological bias. His perception was that “half the 
professional economists of Japan are Marxists illiterate in ‘modern economics.’ This is a mere guess and 
not a statistical estimate”. (Bronfenbrenner 1956; 390) and that a visiting American would remain 
shocked by this clear division between the two factions. Bronfenbrenner described the “the typical 
Japanese Kōza -Ha Marxist” as a “a rigid follower of a party line, usually the Communist but 
occasionally the Left Socialist. Even when his specialty is economics, all he knows is Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, Stalin and their popularizers. He is proud of his ignorance-everyone else having been refuted 
either by one of his "Big Four" or by the march of events.” (Bronfenbrenner 1956; 391) This is much 
in line with the description of Kōza-ha made by their rivals of the Rōnō-ha. In fact, Bronfenbrenner 
stated that the Rōnō-ha members were the only faction with which it was possible to speak, since they 
were less dogmatic and more open to the dialogue. However, for Bronfenbrenner, the whole question 
of the correct development stage of Japan was pointless and the result of the misapplication of the 
theories of history. His judgement was that “I cannot help interpreting the whole controversy as 
indicating the difficulty of applying general theories of history ex ante to problems of planning and 
forecasting, however useful they may be ex post in explicating the past.” (Bronfenbrenner 1983, 12).  
The second paper, “Japanese Economics Revisited” is almost entirely focused on modern 
economics. The only words for Marxists are to describe them as ideologues, frozen in their convictions. 
Bronfenbrenner fully returned on the topic of Japanese Marxist economics in his 1983 speech to the 
History of Economics Society, but his opinions remained substantially the same. He went a little bit 
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deeper on the history of Marxism in Japan, mainly because he had to face an audience not familiar with 
the topic, but the final judgement remained almost unchanged. Marxists are said to disagree violently 
among themselves, “like Marxists elsewhere” (Bronfenbrenner 1983; 8), and with modern economists. 
There were three major fields of disputes, as he quoted from Itoh Makoto: first, the famous 
transformation problem, i.e. is it possible to derive prices from values, as Marx tried to do. In this 
debate Japan had its own Böhm-Bawerk in the figure of Koizumi Shinzo (1888 - 1966) and the Marxist 
faction puzzled on the response to give him78. Bronfenbrenner also reported the debate on rent theory, 
with anti-Marxists Hijikata Seibi (1890 – 1975) and Takata Yasuma (1883 – 1972) and again the 
Marxists were divided on how to respond. The real conflict, however, was the one between the 
aforementioned Kōza-ha and Rono-ha during the 1930s about the application of the theories of 
capitalist development to the Japanese context. This was the first time that Bronfenbrenner explicitly 
wrote about this conflict and the implications for the Marxist side.  
During the years of the economic growth, the Marxists economists lost some ground, but still 
remained in the economic scene. Bronfenbrenner and Ito had different opinions on the reason for the 
survival of Marxism. Bronfenbrenner argued that the reason lied in the background of the war 
destruction, “and with their recollection of the Great Depression, the Japanese associate capitalist 
prosperity with war somewhere in the world and prefer an economic system which (as they see it) 
avoids any necessity for choice between depression and warfare.” (Bronfenbrenner 1983; 15). Ito was 
of different opinion. For him, the reason was that Japanese people, thanks to the loss of the Pacific 
War, knew that a social order could be reversed and changed and Marxism is another way to do the 
same things, but this time by themselves. However, for Bronfenbrenner there was another explanation, 
probably the most accurate for this: Marxian economics was simply better taught with respect modern 
economics at the elementary level. Moreover, it had immediate connection to the problems of everyday 
life and it relies less on mathematics.  
                                                        
78 Itoh Makoto (1936 - ) is a Japanese economist and is considered to be one of the most important 
scholars of Marx's theory of value. He is professor at the Kokugakuin University, Tokyo, and is professor 
emeritus of the University of Tokyo. 
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3.3 The Complex Reality of Japanese Marxism 
Bronfenbrenner’s exposition of the Marxist tradition suffers from some drawbacks. First, the 
link between the various Marxist schools and their political inspirations is not clear. As a result, the 
story of Marxism seems oversimplified and too linear. The history of Marxism is connected with the 
complex intellectual context of Taisho and Showa Japan, which saw many different responses to the 
social crisis of those years. There was in fact an important momentum of break between the first 
introduction of Marxism in Japan and the formation of the Kōza-ha dogmatism.  
Kawakami Hajime (1879 - 1946) was the first recognized Marxists thinker in Japan. He became 
Marxist as a response to the intellectual crisis of the post-Russo-Japanese war (1904 – 1905). He tried 
to create an economic theory that would allow people to be independent as individuals, in contrast to 
the new political system that considered the family (and not the individual) as the smallest social unit. 
The thought of Kawakami was expanded and criticized by two main critics within the Marxist 
economists, Fukumoto Kazuo (1894 - 1983) and Miki Kiyoshi (1897 - 1945). With his “materialistic 
dialectic method”, Fukumoto criticized Kawakami for his ignorance on the philosophical basis of 
Marxism. Miki Kiyoshi tried to overcome the gap between the socialism and the personalistic view of 
man. However, when he tried to enhance his understanding of Marxism in a way that was different 
from the standard dialectical materialism he incurred in sharp criticism. He leaved Marxist economics 
after those critiques. After Miki’s failure, Japanese Marxists thinkers all accepted the Soviet version as 
the orthodox Marxist philosophy. Moreover, the Russian revolution of 1917 had a huge impact on 
Japan and its intellectual life. The revolution strengthened the democratic movement and gave new 
energy to the socialist movement. The Japanese Communist Party was formed in 1922, although it was 
disbanded after only one year. This is the reason of the adherence of Japanese Marxists to the Soviet 
interpretation and the progressive increase of dogmatism between Marxist economists. 
Bronfenbrenner’s analysis did not show the complexity of visions and debates, but instead it was 
focused only on the most radical aspect of the Kōza-ha Marxism. For example, Bronfenbrenner openly 
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considered Japanese Marxism as “partisan propaganda” (Bronfenbrenner 1956; 392), although 
maintaining that it had a practical importance, without really explaining in which sense or how it was 
important.  
Another critique to Bronfenbrenner’s treatment of Marxism is well expressed by Thomas 
Sekine. He wrote a letter to Bronfenbrenner on September 29th, 1967 about the draft of his paper 
“Japanese Economics Revisited”79. There is a comment on Bronfenbrenner’s approach to Japanese 
Marxism: “I am a little disappointed that you avoided to comment on Japanese Marxism, except its 
radical aspect. In fact the Japanese tradition of social science is built on Marxism; it has its creative 
history, entirely unrecognized by Western observer.” (Sekine 1967). Sekine brought the example of 
Uno Kozo, whose work “is the highest level of the Japanese economics, because it is strictly Japanese 
(neither Russian or Chinese) and because it is theoretically firm – i.e. quite different from a casual 
impressionistic study of Das Kapital by sympathetic outsiders” (Sekine 1967).  
A similar opinion is expressed by another economist whose signature is not readable in a letter 
dated August 29th, 1967. In his opinion Bronfenbrenner’s observations of the Japanese economic 
thought situation were not “sharp” enough, meaning that in some cases he could not really grasp the 
true reality of Japanese economics. The problem was, again, his analysis of Marxian economics. The 
writer stated that Bronfenbrenner failed to explain why the Marxian economic tradition still persisted 
alongside modern economics. The reason was that, in his opinion, Japanese economy, despite the post-
war growth and wealth, still presented particular characteristics that require  
 
the broad sociological approaches and the reform-oriented considerations 
associated with Marxian ‘economics’ (political economy, to be exact), namely, the 
traditional "nijyu kozo" (esp. wide wage disparities between large and small enterprises) due 
to social and occupational immobility, the inadequate social insurance system, exceptionally 
                                                        
79  Sekine Tomohiko (1933 - ) a.k.a Thomas T. Sekine is a Japanese economist. He is a scholar of Uno Kozo and 
works in the field of Marx's labor theory of value. 
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heavy reliance on regressive taxation, the inefficient and unimaginative fiscal-monetary 
policies for greater equality and stability, the lingering suspicion of ‘zaibatsu’ and their 
political influences, the conservative political leaders' affection and loyalty to what the 
liberals consider an immoral ‘American capitalism’ [Ken (?);1967] 
 
This is an opinion that comes evidently from the Marxists side, but it was nevertheless widely 
shared in Japan and it gives an idea of how much the Marxian tradition was rooted in the Japanese 
economics.  
According to Morris-Suzuki (1989), Bronfenbrenner’s judgement on Marxian economics was 
not entirely fair and too rooted in his current times. There was a difference between the Marxists 
debate before the WWII and the one after the American occupation. This is something that 
Bronfenbrenner did not mention in his first two papers and sketched only in his 1983 speech. Second, 
as we will see in the next paragraph, the Marxist influence in the economic debate would gradually fade 
and become less prominent as the economy kept growing at a sustained rate.  
Another important assessment of Bronfenbrenner’s opinion about Marxist economists came 
from Matsuura Tamotsu80. He commented that Bronfenbrenner failed in recognizing in the Kōza-ha 
approach to Marxism some features of Japanese intellectual history:  
 
In his first paper he examined the ‘Koza’ school (fundamentalist), being essential to 
the Japanese Marxian economics. The economists of the ‘Koza’ school considered Marx’s 
Das Kapital as a sort of Bible, engaging almost exclusively in its textual exegesis, especially 
in that of its first volume. Such a learning method was a uniquely Japanese one, based on 
its traditional academic culture. In the Tokugawa age, such a method was dominant in 
scholarship about Confucianism. [Matsuura 1999; 506]. 
 
                                                        
80 Maatsura Tamotsu (1931 - ) is a Japanese economist, Professor at Keio University. 
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This particular method was not characteristic of all economic school in Japan, but it a good 
example of how difficult can the comparative study of the history of economic thought.  
Bronfenbrenner did not have a good opinion of Japanese Marxists also because he felt himself 
to be a modern economist and because he considered them to be too stuck in ideology. It is important 
to highlight that Bronfenbrenner was not against Marxian studies, as he repeatedly stated during the 
paper: “I am the last man in the world to disparage the intellectual depth and achievement of Das 
Kapital, not to mention the philosophical system in which Marx embedded his economics, but the 
Japanese Zengakuren81 and the New American Left are something else again!” (Bronfenbrenner 1967; 
5). 
This quote shows how Bronfenbrenner was against the ideological approach to Marxism and 
not the study of the contributions of Karl Marx. His antipathy for the Japanese Marxism can be 
explained with the fact that the Kōza-ha were the most active faction and, more important, they were 
more ideology-oriented. Bronfenbrenner’s opinions about Japanese economic thought reflect his 
opinions about economics as a discipline. He was a neoclassical economist by education, but he was 
also interested in the different voices within economics. He wrote papers on Marx (“Das Kapital” for 
the Modern Man (1965) or “Radical economics” (Radical Economics in America: A 1970 Survey 
(1970), A Skeptical View of Radical Economics (1973)) show, and at the same time he used neoclassical 
economics as a tool of analysis. However, he disliked the ideological side of Marxism, but also the 
excessive use of mathematics with respect to economic contents. He criticized both the radical 
economics for being sometimes blinded by ideology, but also his “ friends and acquaintances of more 
orthodox, conservative, or Mont-Pelerinian bent” (Bronfenbrenner 1973; 7) for “scrutinizing 
inscrutable n-sectoral, m-factoral growth models spifflicated in the Lobkowitz sense, computing 
elasticities of obfuscation on selected Ougadougou postum plantations, or deducing what Adam Smith 
or Ricardo might have had say about Keynes and Marshall” (Bronfenbrenner 1973; 7). His analysis on 
                                                        
81 The Zengakuren was a league of university student associations, founded in 1948. He is famous for having 
organized many protests and revolts, especially in the 1960s. The word Zengakuren is an abridgement of Zen Nihon Gakusei 
Jichikai Sō Rengō which literally means "All-Japan League of Student Self-Government Associations." 
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Japanese economic thought and economics display a great coherence with his beliefs on economics as a 
subject. He criticized Marxist economists for being too ideological and, as we will see, he warned the 
opposite faction, the modern economists, against the temptation of the excessive mathematization.  
In the next section we will see how Bronfenbrenner described the situation of those economists 
who were closer to his own view of economics, i.e. the so-called modern economists. 
 
3.4 Modern Economists  
The term “modern economists” (kindai keizaigakusha) originated in the pre-WWII period to 
differentiate the ideas of those economists who were not Marxian or Marxists. It is not related to a 
periodization, but rather is used in opposition to Marxism. The term was initially used by non-Marxist 
European economists in order to differentiate themselves from the “outdated” Marxists economists. 
However, non- Marxian theories were already present in Japan. During the Meiji period, many schools 
of thought arrived in Japan, not only in the economic field, but also in politics and philosophy. For 
example, while the German Historical School was much studied in public universities as the 
government’s preferred economic theory, the British classical economics was translated and taught in 
private institutions. During the inter-war Japan, the central concern for economists became the analysis 
of Japanese economic structure, particularly in terms of Marx’s theory of modes of production, 
therefore the non-Marxian economics were left behind the main debates. 
In the post-WWII era and until 1960s, the majority of economists were still Marxist or Marxian. 
The remaining part of modern economists were mostly oriented toward development economics 
instead of neoclassical studies (Ikeo 2000; 221). Among the modern economists there were different 
waves of debates, shaped by the internal and international context.  
During the 30s and 40s the debate was on the so-called pattern of growth or “flying goose” 
pattern, i.e. which road would Japanese economic growth take, since the economic development was 
not stable, but there was always some economic crisis to face. By the end of the war, Japan’s 
production capacity was destroyed, there was a general lack of food. The American occupation with the 
SCAP started to implement economic and social reforms first in order to transform Japan in a 
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democracy and eliminate the risk of another war, and second to transform it in an ally against the 
Communist block during the Cold War. In the 40s-50s, after the signals of economic recovery, the 
debate shifted toward international trade and its role in the economic development of Japan, together 
with a debate on which industry to promote to ensure stable imports. Finally, during the 60s and 70s in 
particular, the main debates on economic growth and economic crisis after the oil shock of 1973. There 
was also a shift in the importance of modern economists: especially after the 1960s, the ability of 
Marxian economics to explain reality weakened and the opinion of modern economist was frequently 
asked. They started to became important also for policy formulation.  
When Bronfenbrenner met Japan, there were two major debates. One was the one on pro-trade 
and pro-development. The debate was started by Nakayama in 1949 that criticized the Dodge plan 
implemented by the allied forces and argued that Japan needed international trade in order to achieve 
economic growth. Nakayama studied under Schumpeter and his growth theories emphasized the role 
of innovation and technology, which are in turn dependent on a country’s resources. Ikeo (2000; 156) 
highlighted that the development economists believed in the role of local government, but also 
entrepreneurship in the private sector. This is in line with the Schumpeterian-style growth theories that 
were discussed at the time (Nakayama studied under Schumpeter) .  
However, he was also heavily influenced by Keynes. He was criticized by many economists, 
including Arisawa Hiromi and Tsuru Shigeto. They contested Nakayama’s description of Japanese 
economy and argued that the development of a strong internal economy was more important. Actually, 
both factions believed that a strong domestic economy was important, but they had different opinions 
on the role of international trade. Nakayama responded that Japan lacked natural resources and it did 
not have enough land to provide food for all his citizens. Despite Japan still lacked enough capital, its 
destiny lied in international trade, as the only source to provide what Japan needed. In the end, the 
debate turned political, on whether Japan should or should not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty and 
being readmitted to the international community, which in the end was signed in 1951.  
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Bronfenbrenner actively participated in the second debate, the one on which industry to 
promote, with commentaries on the main arguments provided by Shinohara Miyohei. The problem was 
to select some industries to promote in order to ensure sufficient exports. The MITI actively promoted 
the heavy and chemical industries, based on criteria proposed by Shinohara, but the result was that the 
government was actively subsidizing sectors of the economy.  
 Those debates showed the increased importance attributed to economists by the government 
and the different economic education of the modern economists after the Second World War.  
 
3.5 Political Economists and Modern Economists 
Bronfenbrenner addressed the issue of the status of modern economists in all his three papers 
about Japan, with the second one of 1967 almost entirely devoted to this topic.  
The world of modern economists should have been less alien to him, also because he actively 
participated in the academic life and economic debates of Japan. He was one of the first Western 
economist who met Japanese economists during the American occupation and was able to speak with 
them. Those exchanges with modern economists increased when he returned in Japan with the Shoup 
mission in 1949 and became a regular habit in 1952, when he participated in the afternoon seminars at 
the Hitotsubashi University. In those seminars he met many important Japanese economists active in 
the aforementioned debates, like Nakayama Ichiro, Tsuru Shigeto and Nakajima Tetsuhito. 
Bronfenbrenner even participated in some Japanese economic debates, something really rare for the 
time, like the Shimomura growth theory debate during the 1960s, a controversy that was seen as 
completely Japanese, or the Shinohara Miyohei arguments on industrial support.  
In his 1956 paper, he divided the non-Marxist economists into two categories: political 
economists and modern economists (Bronfenbrenner 1956; 392). This division is peculiar of 
Bronfenbrenner’s analysis, since it is not found elsewhere in the literature on Japanese economic 
thought. The political economists were those trained in the period between the world wars, if not 
before. They conserved the trace of the influence of the German Historical School and could be 
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considered the institutionalist of Japan. Their interests were public finance, welfare economics and 
everything related to social policy. The major problem with this group was that it had been too 
accommodating during the “fascist decades” and after the war they were “under something of a cloud 
among their fellow intellectuals.” (Bronfenbrenner 1956; 392). 
He did not provide names of economists or associations, but considering the description, he 
was probably referring to the Association for the Study of Social Policy, established in 1896 and 
modelled after the German Verein fur Sozialpolitik, the main association of the so called German Social 
Policy School. The members of the Association conceived economics as deeply linked with moral and 
political issues. Subject of the economic research should be therefore the concern for the social welfare 
of the subject. However, rather that revolutionize the system, they sought to stabilize the capitalist 
system by regulating the potentially dangerous forces of unions and organized labor. Among 
economists that can be considered political economists, the most famous were Kanai Noburu (1865 - 
1933) and Fukuda Tokuzo (1874 – 1930), both members of the Association. Fukuda, in particular, was 
an eclectic intellectual and imported both the Marxian theories and the British and Austrian neoclassical 
economics. As the two rival theories began to spread, the Association divided into two factions and 
eventually crumbled in in the early 1920s, leaving the incurable fracture between Marxist and non-
Marxist economist that Bronfenbrenner witnessed.  
Bronfenbrenner described the modern economists as the group that managed to catch up with 
England and the United States, “from a position of nearly hopeless inferiority.” (Bronfenbrenner 1956; 
393). They were the youngest scholars and they could be considered the Anglo-American tradition’s 
ambassadors in Japan. Their work was characterized by a high degree of abstraction and a heavy use of 
mathematics. “Equally at home in micro- and macroeconomics, their attention has tended to 
concentrate along lines of Walrasian general equilibrium, Keynesian income and employment theory, 
and Harrodian dynamics, to the neglect of the standard pabulum of partial equilibrium.” 
(Bronfenbrenner 1956; 392). 
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As example of prominent modern economists, Bronfenbrenner mentioned the “Japanese 
Marshall” Takata Yasuma and Nakayama Ichiro (1898 – 1981) in the Schumpeterian tradition, but 
without explaining the reason of their importance. Takata tried to solve the problem of reconciling 
neo-classical theory and reality. He tried to incorporate sociology into the framework of neo-classical 
analysis. Takata is famous for his ‘power theory’ (seiryoku setsu), in which he proposed that the utility of a 
commodity reflects not only its ability to satisfy physical needs, but also its ability to fulfil the natural 
human desire for power and social esteem. His contemporary and rival Nakayama was a scholar of the 
aforementioned Fukuda Tokuzo. He studied in Germany and wrote the first the first serious study of 
Japanese economic development. Nakayama studied Walras and developed an economic theory based 
on the notion of general equilibrium and helped to introduce the concepts of marginalism and general 
equilibrium analysis in Japan.  
According to Bronfenbrenner, the major drawback of the modern economists of the 19650s in 
Japan was that their attention was focused mostly on theoretical issues, leaving unfilled the gap between 
theoretical and applied economics.  
The consequences of this bias were analyzed in detail in another paper, “The State of Japanese 
Economics: revisited”, published in 1967 in a Japanese journal. The occasion to write again about the 
state of the Japanese economic thought came when he was asked to write a paper for the Keizai Seminar 
(Economic Seminar) in 196782. The request came from Nakajima Tetsuhito, professor of economics at 
Doshisha University in Kyoto: Nakajima asked for a paper about the persistent dualism in Japanese 
economic thought from the perspective of a non-Japanese scholar. Bronfenbrenner was appreciated for 
his sharp criticism and great accuracy in his analysis: Nakajima asked then the dokusetsuka-sensei to 
provide an update of his 1956 paper. Apart for a small section about Marxist economists, this new 
paper was then focused mainly on the development of modern economics. The economic growth 
required a new kind of economic theories to be understood and explained and the “modern” 
economics theories seemed the more appropriate to deal with the new economic environment.  
                                                        
82 The text of the paper was written in English and then translated into Japanese.  
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For Bronfenbrenner, everything was going well in Japanese modern economics at the end of 
the 1960s, at least on the surface. The number of scholars increased and they started to publish in 
international journals. Even the influx of Marxian economics seemed to give signs of weakening. 
However, this was just the surface: the reality was that modern economics was becoming more and 
more mathematical and it was losing economic meaning. Bronfenbrenner had a declared dislike for the 
excessive mathematization of economics: in his opinion, it was not good for the discipline to become 
completely part of the statistical-mathematical science. It is no surprise, then that he saw the hyper 
specialization of economics as something detrimental for the discipline.  
The consequences of this hyper-specialization in mathematical models were twofold: on one 
hand there was the “widening of the gnostic gap between theory and application” (Bronfenbrenner 
1967; 3) and the “temporary abdication of the teaching functions to people ignorant of 20th century 
developments and viscerally opposed to them.” (Bronfenbrenner 1967; 3). The gap between theory and 
practice goes to the advantage of Marxist economists, who on the contrary advocated the unity of 
theory and practice. Moreover, many modern economists spent the most part of their productive 
academic life abroad, therefore neglecting their teaching activity. The deficits in the economic 
education at the university level was directly responsible for the survival of Marxists economists.  
In Bronfenbrenner’s vision, the affirmation of the modern economics and the progressive 
abandonment of the Marxian tradition was an essential step to fully develop the production of original 
Japanese contributions to economics. The persistence of Marxism and the isolation of modern 
economists were the two main obstacles to the full development of Japanese economics: “Behind the 
fine facade of greatness, if I am right, the rice-roots level of Japanese economics has advanced 
disappointingly little in the last ten years -- perhaps even the last 20.” (Bronfenbrenner 1967; 5). 
However, there are many other obstacles for modern economists to overcome in order to 
achieve the favor in the competition of economic ideas in Japan. First, the intuitive fact that the 
opposition to modern economics would remain strong, since there was the interest to maintain the 
intellectual monopolies where they were present. The transition to modern economics was a slow 
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process, helped by the involvement of modern economists in policy recommendations. It is also worth 
considering the appeal that Marxism had on students with respect to modern economics: modern 
economics was seen as a tough subject and it is pretty understandable that freshmen just graduated 
from high school became fascinated with the slogans and emotional arguments of Marxism.  
Second, modern economics had the drawback of not having engaged in the debate and 
resolution of real problems, but instead “is about x and y, inputs and outputs, graphs and equations, 
money and markets – ‘economic fetishism’ in Marx’ terms” (Bronfenbrenner 1967; 6). Modern 
economists rarely engaged in addressing problems of the everyday life. Marxism, on the other hand, 
with its slogan of unity of theory and practice, had taken into consideration all those real-world 
problems ignored by modern economics, but important to people. The debate on international trade 
and industries were important to economists, but less understandable by the people. Bronfenbrenner 
clarified that he was not saying that Japanese economists should abandon mathematical economics, but 
instead they should find a balance between theory and practice and to strengthen the teaching of 
economics. But why did modern economics not engage in the analysis of those problems? “because, 
ever since Kawakami's day, Japanese Marxism has taken so many of the most pressing of those 
problems, those involving abject poverty, as its private academic preserve. Also, Japan has not yet had a 
Franklin Roosevelt or a John F. Kennedy in power to pull modern economists into welfarist 
preoccupations.” (Bronfenbrenner 1967; 6). There was a sort of vicious circle: modern economists did 
not engage in real-world problems because it was Marxists’ territory, therefore reinforcing the 
predominance of Marxists in those fields. This was also related to a problem of Japanese economic 
development: despite the high rates of savings and economic growth Japan had a low level of public 
investments and public welfare. This trend continued for all the years of economic boom and it started 
to be evident during the 1970s, when the first signals of crisis started to appear. The lack of 
participation in government advisory activities could be linked to this lack of welfare preoccupations. 
Third, modern economists tended to rationalize the interests of the power élite composed by 
bureaucrats, big business and “technocratic planners”. To understand what Bronfenbrenner is talking 
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about is necessary to look at Japanese history. The allegiance between big business, in the form of the 
zaibatsu (big industrial and financial conglomerates, often owned by one single family), bureaucracy and 
politics was a characteristic of the early Showa era (1926 – 1989), and in particular of the years before 
the war. It was one of the characteristics of the economic development of Japan during the Taisho and 
Showa era. In the post-war era, with the transformation of zaibatsu in keiretsu and the new democratic 
environment the links between them started to weaken. However, the cooperation between private 
enterprises and the government remained. Despite the emergence of new enterprise groups during the 
1960s, less tied to the administration, the collaboration between industrial powers and government was 
still an important feature of the Japanese economic environment. The government’s economic plans 
were always made in accordance with the industrial sector and that is a possible reason for 
Bronfenbrenner’s statement.  
Bronfenbrenner’s solution to improve Japanese economics was that Japan should have a group 
of economists not tied with any particular interest group, but unemotionally interested in the policy 
problems of the Japanese economy. Those economists should try to study them in different ways of the 
other two groups of economists. In particular, they should ask first what a competitive market would 
do, and not blaming some “wicked men” or passing bills that strengthen monopolies (he was probably 
referring to the still powerful keiretsu). This is an evident influx of his US economic education.  
 
Professors Ichimura, Kamakura, and Nishiyama come to mind on university 
campuses, Dr. Kiuchi in a private research agency, and Dr. Shimomura with one foot in 
government, the other in banking circles. They can, however, hardly be said to form a 
school, like the contemporary "Chicago school" in the United States or the former 
"Freiburg school" in Germany. Despite a personal distaste for economic sectarianism as 
such, I suspect Japanese economics would be improved by the congealing of these and 
other "classical liberal" elements into a recognized and indigenous gakuha [school]. 
[Bronfenbrenner 1967; 7] 
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This new generation of Japanese economists did not form a proper school on the model of the 
US economic schools, mostly because their field of action was very different and differentiated. In 
Bronfenbrenner’s opinion, those economists should combine their “classical liberal” elements and form 
a school, in order to oppose to Marxist schools. 
For Bronfenbrenner the contraposition between Marxian and Modern economics was clearly an 
obstacle to the full development of Japanese economics: 
 
I found the main obstacles to (2) [the development of the non-Japanese part of the 
Japanese economics], above, in (a) extreme stress on ideological matters in the Japanese 
universities, particularly (b) the running battle between Marxian and modern economics, 
and also (c) the tendency of so many economists of all persuasions to resort to 
emotionalism and slogans in discussing public issues. Perhaps I should also have 
mentioned (d) the honyaku-gakumon tradition. [Bronfenbrenner 1968]83 
 
This statement is contained in a letter to Professor Kitano Yukio of Kobe University, where 
Bronfenbrenner analyzed the problem of modern economic in Japan. In the same letter, he explained 
how there was a wrong perception of Japanese economics outside Japan:  
 
About ‘Japanese economics’ as seen outside Japan, I myself tried to say (a) that it is 
only a small part of true Japanese economics as seen within Japan, and also (b) that, at the 
same time that it has received international respect, it has become something of an 
international joke. I think we agree to these two propositions. We differ, perhaps, in that I 
see a larger role than you for mathematics and statistics in economic theory. […] I also 
                                                        
83 Letter from Bronfenbrenner to Kitano Yukio February 15th, 1968, Martin Bronfenbrenner Papers, David M. 
Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 13. 
 107 
doubt that “Japanese economics” represents American cultural imperialism, because our 
own "Japanese economists" are not, on the whole, favored particularly by the U. S. 
Government. [Bronfenbrenner 1968] 
 
This passage contains an important assertion. For Bronfenbrenner the Japanese economics of 
his time was not a product of the American influence, because Japanese economic thought had 
distinctive and independent developments that were not always appreciated in Japan. He reaffirmed the 
“international joke” definition, meaning that Japanese economics was recognized internationally, but at 
the same time it lost its economic component.  
He gave also a quite cryptic advice to the Japanese economic students in order to improve the 
economics in Japan: “My advice to Japanese students, which I had no real right to offer, was that they 
should work to raise the non-‘Japanese economics’ parts of Japanese economics to the same world level 
that "Japanese economics" has already reached.” (Bronfenbrenner 1968)84. The meaning is that 
Japanese students should work on the part that are neglected by the average Japanese economist, i.e. 
the attention to policy problems. 
Overall, his opinions about modern economists were more positive than the judgement on 
Marxist economists. The major drawbacks were the over specialization in mathematics at the expense 




4. Inbreeding and Schizophrenia  
                                                        
84 Letter from Bronfenbrenner to Kitano Yukio. February 15th, 1968.  Martin Bronfenbrenner Papers, David M. 
Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University, Box 13. 
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The other two characteristics of the Japanese economic thought of the post-WWII period were 
institutional inbreeding and schizophrenia. The latter in particular became very famous and it is still 
debated nowadays. 
For “institutional inbreeding” Bronfenbrenner meant that the best universities in Japan tend to 
hire their own graduates as faculty members “and it is a sign of newness or inferiority to recruit widely 
from outside.” (Bronfenbrenner 1956; 395). Every major universities and many of the minor ones had 
their own internal journal, where the members of the faculty publish their own papers and which was 
read by its own audience. However, despite this unusual situation, from an American point of view, 
many of the feared negative outcome of academic inbreeding were absent. Bronfenbrenner explains 
that in many departments of economics there were Marxists, political economists and modern 
economists. “A Japanese economics department may be staffed 100 per cent by people without degrees 
from anywhere else, but it is still a kind of economic macrocosm in microcosm, never an obscure cult 
of forgotten local celebrities.” (Bronfenbrenner 1956, 395).  
This attachment to the alma mater did not cause intellectual isolation either. He reported that 
there was an active exchange of ideas between universities and for Bronfenbrenner the reason was that 
Japan is a small country with the major universities concentrated in few big cities. Professors often 
teach in more than one university in order to supplement their income, so there is a certain degree of 
exchange of ideas. It is worth adding that Japanese people on average tend to read a lot and this helps 
the diffusion of theories and ideas.  
The last characteristic of the Japanese economics is what Bronfenbrenner called “professional 
schizophrenia”. He observed that many professors would teach something in classroom and then say 
quite the opposite in other situations, like interviews. “Many Japanese economists have the same kind 
of split personality. Outside the classroom, they dabble in anything and everything.” (Bronfenbrenner 
1956; 396). For Bronfenbrenner this is due to two causes. First, the low stipends of professors, which 
forced them to do everything they could to raise money, from “They write for newspapers and low-
brow magazines, direct companies and pressure groups, arbitrate labor disputes, and arrange 
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marriages”. (Bronfenbrenner 1956; 396). Second, it was something rooted in the Chinese and Japanese 
tradition.  
 
It is quite in accordance with Chinese and Japanese tradition. There is a proverb: 
“Seki no atatamaru itoma nashi,” meaning that a great man never stays still long enough to 
warm the cushion where he sits. Many Japanese professors consider themselves great men, 
and juggle multitudes of jobs accordingly. Yet when they enter the classroom, they usually 
purge themselves of all extracurricular sin by becoming as abstract and otherworldly as they 
can. [Bronfenbrenner 1956; 396]. 
 
This schizophrenia seemed to affect mostly the modern economists, since the Marxists were 
considered more coherent. However, this does not make Bronfenbrenner to chance opinion about 
them: “They harangue their classes and seminars on the same problems as they harangue their street-
corner audiences and the readers of Akahata ("Red Flag"-the Japanese equivalent of the Daily Worker), 
and sometimes in the same vulgar language. This is another example of the "unity of theory and 
practice.” (Bronfenbrenner 1956; 396).  
The negative consequences are nonetheless present. According to Bronfenbrenner, less 
attention was paid to problems of Japanese economy and to the collection of economic and statistical 
data at the academic level. There were of course economic data, but they were poor and lacked 
comparability. The situation was already on the path of getting better at Bronfenbrenner’s time, with 
the production of national statistics, like family-budget studies, production indexes and balances of 
payments. Another important difference with the United States was the lack of migration between 
academia and government, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. The result was that Japanese 
government relied mostly on attorneys for most of the consulting jobs, that in the US are reserved for 
professional economists. Many modern economists were too theoretical, or did not want to completely 
leave their academic job.  
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In terms of the academic work turned out by people whose practical interests are 
somewhere else, there seem to be three problems. In theoretical work there is excess 
abstraction; in institutional work, there is excess antiquarianism; in all fields, there is too 
much concentration on transmission and translation of the works of foreign scholars at the 
expense of “look and see.” Please do not misunderstand me. The empirical spirit is very 
much present, but it is exercised in the scholar's outside job, not in his professional 
connection. [Bronfenbrenner 1956; 397] 
 
When Bronfenbrenner wrote those lines, the situation was already improving, largely thanks to 
the younger generation of economists and to the creation of specific institutions devoted to economic 
research, like the one at the Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo and the other at the Osaka National 
University. He highlighted the importance of the Economic Planning Board for the economic research, 
which example was followed by other agencies like the famous Ministries of Finance, Agriculture, and 
Trade and Industry (MITI). He noticed the role that economists played in participating in advisory 
committee, research bodies and semi-governmental agencies (Morris-Suzuki 1989, 114).  
This account of Bronfenbrenner is not completely true. It may have been less back and forth 
from academia to government, but the role of economists in the post war period was not marginal. The 
tradition of organizing advisory committees of different kind dates back to the pre-war period, when 
organizations such as the Shōwa Research Association at times provided political refuge for economists 
of liberal or left-wing views. (Morris-Suzuki 1989; 134). In post-war Japan politicians and officials sook 
the help of liberal economists and, in particular, of those who were trained overseas. However, the 
most important factor of interaction was indeed the economic planning process during the 
reconstruction. (Morris-Suzuki 1989). There were also many semi-governmental research bodies that 
received commissions from the government.  “What emerges from these observations is not that 
Japan’s leading non- Marxian economists had great influence over the details of economic 
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policymaking— nor that they have invariably agreed with the policy directions taken by government—
but rather that their theoretical perspectives and empirical research helped to shape the environment in 
which post-war policy was created. (Morris-Suzuki 1989; 135).  
The oddities that characterized Japan in fact were less severe with respect to what emerges from 
Bronfenbrenner’s paper. In particular, his opinion on “professional schizophrenia” left a great 
impression on the scholars of Japanese economic thought and it is still refered to.  
 
5. The 1983 Speech: Understanding Japan at the Peak of Its Power  
Many of the tendencies highlighted by Bronfenbrenner in his 1956 and 1967 papers were 
confirmed in his 1983 presidential speech for the History of Economics Society, “Western Economics 
Transplanted to Japan”. The importance of Bronfenbrenner’s speech can be fully understood if we 
consider that the attention of the Western countries toward Japan was very different in the 1980s with 
respect the 1960s.  
The reason for this increased attention was Japan’s extraordinary economic performance. The 
main feature of Japanese economics of the years between the 1960s and 1980s was economic growth, 
and the Western countries realized with a mix of fear and admiration how economically powerful Japan 
was. Japanese incomes doubled from 1960 to 1967 and Japan’s GNP became the second biggest after 
the United States in 1968. This race of economic growth was temporary interrupted by the oil shock of 
1973, in 1974 Japan experienced the first negative growth rate since the war. However, Japan recovered 
faster than other countries. Apart from a small slump following a second and lesser oil shock in 1979, it 
was to maintain this average well beyond the 1970s. This rapid recovery was another source of respect 
from the West, and seemed to suggest that Japan, as an economic power, was invincible. Japan’s 
economy, already the second largest in the world, continued to grow at around 4% during the early 
1980s and its trade surplus with America, which had started to develop since the late 1970s, became 
massive.  
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The prolonged economic growth caused anti-Japanese feeling around the world. They were 
really acute especially in the 1970s and 1980s, when it seemed that Japan was “buying the world”. The 
West felt defeated by a nation that was reduced to ashes not too long ago.  
If the post-war Japanese economists were interested in development economics and the 
economists of the economic boom in the causes of economic growth, the economists after the 1970s 
had to deal with the causes of economic crises. The confidence in the strategies of modern economists 
began to crumble, as Japan did not experience the rate of growth of the 1960s. The Keynesian policies 
were particularly criticized. After the yen revaluation of the 1970-1971 the government approved some 
budget measures that resulted in a severe inflation. Increasing demand for welfare and military 
spending with declining growth rates led to budget deficits. Despite this situation, the authority of 
economists of the previous generation was not undermined. It was only in the mid-1970s that the 
young generation of economists started to attack the growth theories of the 1960s. In particular, 
monetarist ideas started to appear in books and magazines, both by academics and bureaucrats.  Japan 
was also undergoing a profound intellectual crisis that went well beyond the boundaries of the modern 
economics. Part of this crisis was related to the gap between academic economics and the problems of 
everyday life.  
The economic debate after the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s was more focused on 
subjects not related to everyday life of people, like trade surpluses or budget deficits. “Keizai 
[economics], Takeuchi suggests, has become more and more obsessed with keikoku (administering the 
nation), and less and less concerned with Saimin (relieving the sufferings of the people).” (Takeuchi 
1986:44 quoted in Morris- Suzuki 1989; 170). 
 
Bronfenbrenner delivered his speech to the History of Economics Society in a time of a great 
debate and public attention about Japan. He had to explain the intellectual economic environment of a 
nation that was a puzzle for the Western public, even for the most educated scholars. Moreover, in the 
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1970s and 1980s a certain stereotyped image of Japan developed in the West, mostly because Japan’s 
economic growth colonized the newspapers and people wanted to know more about this country. 
In this perspective, Bronfenbrenner’s speech acquires a huge importance, because it was not 
only another window to the East, but it was the explanation of what was going on in the economic 
environment in a mysterious yet important country.  
He started with a short history of the Japanese economic thought, from the first introduction of 
the Western knowledge in the Meiji era to the post-WWII period, highlighting the peculiarities of the 
Western economic knowledge transplanted to Japan. He then analyzed the impact that the profound 
changes in the social and economic context caused by the economic growth had on the Japanese 
economic thought. In his opinion, those changes made the Japanese economic thought move toward 
what he called “convergence”, i.e. convergence toward American or Western European mainstream. 
This convergence was already on the way when he first wrote “The State of Japanese Economics”, but 
he admitted that he failed to recognize this phenomenon. The effect of the convergence is that the 
economic specializations started to be similar to American reality.  
Bronfenbrenner presented the Japanese economic thought as characterized by three features 
that may seem strange for a “Western visitor”: first, “the rise and persistence of a complex or syndrome 
of honyaku-gakumon (translation as scholarship), ikkoku-ichijo (over-specialization in the works of a 
single Western authority) and the routine re-testing of standard economic propositions on the Japanese 
scene. I propose to call this complex or syndrome ‘prewar Japanese economics,’ although it was never 
by any means the whole story.” (Bronfenbrenner 1983; 6).  
Matsuura Tamotsu commented on this point that Bronfenbrenner failed to un understand that 
the translation of Western economic literature was an important part of the academic curriculum and 
that it was deeply rooted in Japanese intellectual history. For Bronfenbrenner it was just a part of the 
over-specialization of the Japanese economists, but in fact it was an essential part of the transmission of 
Western knowledge to Japan. (Matsuura 1999; 507). This view is confirmed by Takenaga (2016; 8), who 
highlighted how the import of economic literature remained an essential aspect of Japanese economics 
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until recent times and led also to interesting differences among private and public universities with 
respect to the kind of literature imported. The literature translated had an important role in determining 
the kind of research that was carried on by the university and the single researcher.  
Second, there was what he called “postwar Japanese economics”, i.e. the overspecialization in 
ultra-rigorous applied mathematics and complex econometrics, mainly focused in producing 
disaggregated models of the Japanese economy. This brought to a stagnation in the research, that is in 
contrast with the dynamism of the economy. This stagnation was confirmed also by Matsuura, who 
stated that “I think that in Japan there a scientific crisis in the economic field, caused by the difficulty to 
face reality. We have to find a new system of theories to overcome those difficulties.” (Matsuura 1972; 
502)85 
Third, “The continued flourishing of Marxian economics (in various versions) on a "market for 
ideas" which is at least as free and competitive as the American.” (Bronfenbrenner 1983; 6). This 
feature in particular was puzzling for Bronfenbrenner, since a better “market of ideas” should have 
wiped away the obsolete Marxists positions. However, as we have seen in the previous sections, the 
Marxian and Marxist tradition was more complex and its survival depended mainly by the fact that it 
was better taught than modern economics. What was the real impact of the convergence then? The 
most evident result was that despite the tendency of over-mathematization, the specializations of 
economists were about to reach the American one and economists started to work on applied issues as 
well.  
 
Six leaders - and there are many more - in the movement of economics to the 
applicable but more-than-"journalistic" are Kanamori Hisao, Komiya Ryutaro, Ohkawa 
Kazushi, Shinohara Miyohei, Tsuru Shigeto, and Yasuba Yasukichi; I have picked these 
names from Japan’s most prestigious universities, and research institutes. […] They work in 
a variety of fields of both pure and applied economics. They move in and out of Academe, 
                                                        
85 My translation. 
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and from one university to another, making the university system less inbred and less 
remote from practical problems. One of them (Dr. Tsuru) defies identification as either a 
pure Marxist or a pure modern economist, being equally at home in both environments. 
[Bronfenbrenner 1983; 16] 
 
Bronfenbrenner remained very skeptical with regard to Japanese Marxism: for him, in Japan 
“every economist knows elementary Marxism, but many Marxists take pride in knowing nothing more. 
(Modern economics? Just a set of classroom exercises in mathematics!)” (Bronfenbrenner 1983; 17). 
The potential to develop Japanese economics was in modern economists, because Marxism had proved 
to be a sterile and dead faction, at least in Japan.  
One of the most important changes, according to Bronfenbrenner, was the role of the 
economists outside academia. As he pointed out following Komiya Ryutaro and Yamamoto Kozo, the 
Japanese language did not include a word for the practicing economist and that no major Japanese 
government post is occupied by an academic economist (keizai-gakusha)86. There was not a specific 
career for economists in the government and most of the lawmakers were law graduates. “Lacking an 
indigenous expression meaning ‘economic practitioner,’ the Japanese use the English word, written as 
ekonomisuto and, as in Britain, the title of an economic periodical.” (Bronfenbrenner 1983; 17). 
Graduates who begin a career in the government would receive only an intensive course in theoretical 
economics, taught by university professors. Those employees were not professional economists, “but 
the best ones combine gifted-amateur or semi-pro status in economics with equal or even superior 
competence in some other field. They are not professional economists; neither was Smith or Ricardo or 
even Mill.” (Bronfenbrenner 1983; 17-18). 
This paper is an adequate conclusion to the Japanese trilogy, since it concluded and enriched 
the analysis of the previous papers. The picture of Japanese economic thought that the audience 
                                                        
86 Komiya Ryutaro (1928) is a Japanese economist, professor at the University of Tokyo.  
Yamamoto Kozo (1948) is a Japanese economist and politician. He is one of the fathers of the Abenomics, the 
economic policy of launched by the former Prime Minister of Japan Abe Shinzo.  
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received was one of a nation that learned a lot from the West, but struggled to find its own voice in the 
economic environment. He challenged the image of the “invincible Japan”, showing the achievements 
of Japanese economics, but also the crisis.  
 
 
A Necessary Attempt 
“The economic thought of every country is necessarily rooted in its intellectual history, so we 
had to learn about that as well. This requires a great deal of effort for a foreign scholar facing language 
and conceptual barriers.” (Matsuura 1999; 506). The task undertaken by Bronfenbrenner was not easy: 
Japanese economic thought, not being an immediate subject of interest by scholars, was already an odd 
subject to write about, not to mention the difficulties of understanding a different culture. 
Bronfenbrenner in this sense was a pioneer in introducing the Japanese economic thought to the 
Western readers. He gave a dense but accurate account of the development of the Japanese economic 
thought after the Second World War and his papers were one of the few windows to the development 
of economics in Japan. More important, they still remain a point of reference in the literature. It is 
always difficult to study another country, especially when its culture is completely different from our 
mother country. Bronfenbrenner, with his manifold personality and curiosity, succeeded in giving an 
account of Japanese economic reality that was fair and with only few drawbacks. He treasured his 
exceptional experience as an economist proficient in Japanese to observe and study not only the 
development of economics in Japan, but how economics changed following the Japanese economic 
boom.  
Matsuura Tamotsu, who met Bronfenbrenner and worked with him, recognized 
Bronfenbrenner’s love and interest for Japan, but he also recognized that he could not overcome some 
cultural differences that prevented him from fully grasping the reality of the Japanese economic 
thought. (Matsuura 1999; 506). One of the best examples is the honyaku-gakumon tradition: it was vital 
for Japanese scholars, but Bronfenbrenner considered it just a waste of time. His major bias was toward 
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Marxism in Japan, which was indeed more complex than Bronfenbrenner described in his papers. He 
described only a part of the Marxian tradition and neglected all the nuances that were indeed present. 
Moreover, some practices which Bronfenbrenner considered strange or outdated were in fact part of 
the Japanese cultural tradition and fundamental for the diffusion of economic knowledge. Despite 
those shortcomings, his papers remain an important source of knowledge of Japanese economic 
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